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Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Among Finance Professionals

Michael Razen† Michael Kirchler‡ Utz Weitzel§

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Abstract

Risk-assessment and risk-taking in various forms are among the most important tasks financial professionals face in their daily work. A large body of experimental studies has shown a substantial effect of the decision domain (gain vs. loss domain) on risk-taking, predominantly among students. In a series of experiments set in different contextual frameworks, we investigate whether this domain effect is also present among experienced finance professionals and compare their decisions with people from the general population. Our results show that employees in the finance industry are equally prone to the domain effect in risk-taking than the general population. Interestingly, for domain-specific risk-taking in a finance context, we find that professionals are more reluctant to sell loser stocks than non-professionals.

JEL: C91, C93, D81, G41

Keywords: Experimental Finance, Financial Professionals, Domain-specific risk-taking.

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1 Introduction

Financial professionals face numerous decisions involving risk-assessment and risk-taking in their daily work. The extent to which they take risks may vary strongly, among others, across job functions (traders vs risk managers), across decision problems (decisions for customers vs decisions for the company), and across the stakes that are involved (high-stakes vs low-stakes). Moreover, other important dimensions of risk-taking center around the decision domain (gain vs loss domain) and the context in which a risky decision presents itself. Experimental studies with predominantly student subjects have impressively shown that decisions are indeed strongly influenced by the decision domain. Most notably, subjects exhibited risk averse behavior in the gain domain, but risk seeking behavior in the loss domain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). However, it is conjectured that the behavior of individuals with real-world market experience would match predictions of neoclassical models more closely (e.g., List, 2003, 2004), leaving the above-cited findings as artefacts of inexperienced experimental subjects. In this paper, we investigate the proneness of experienced financial professionals to domain-dependent risk-taking in various lab-in-the-field experiments. We find domain effects for both groups in a non-monetary decision problem, as professionals and non-professionals take markedly more risk in the loss domain than in the gain domain.\(^1\) Importantly, professionals also exhibit a strong domain effect in an explicit finance context—they are even more prone to ride loser stocks in investment decisions than non-professionals.

Since the seminal studies of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Prospect Theory has been established as one of the most important positive theories of decision making. It postulates, among others, that decision makers first set a reference point to assess whether the outcomes of the decision are perceived as gains or losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). When it comes to evaluating these outcomes,

\(^1\)For simplicity, we use the term professionals for finance professionals and non-professionals for employees outside the finance industry throughout the paper.
losses are viewed as more painful than gains of equal magnitude are viewed as beneficial. Specifically, decision makers usually show risk-averse behavior in the gain domain and risk-seeking behavior in the loss domain. List (2003), however, issues the criticism that these results could be driven by inexperience. In an experimental study, he finds that the endowment effect—a bias closely related to Prospect Theory—can be attenuated with market experience in a market for sports memorabilia. In a follow-up study, List (2004) reports that Prospect Theory explains the behavior of inexperienced market participants in a sports card market, but experienced participants show behavior in line with neoclassical predictions.

Especially in finance, a small but growing body of literature analyzes whether experienced market participants exhibit behavior that is closer to neoclassical predictions and less prone to behavioral biases. Evidence is mixed, as some studies report financial professionals to exhibit large biases (Haigh and List, 2005; Cipriani and Guarino, 2009; Deaves et al., 2010; Abdellaoui et al., 2013; Kirchler et al., 2018; Schwaiger et al., 2019), while another body of literature finds that professionals show a behavior that is relatively close to neoclassical benchmarks (Alevy et al., 2007; Kaustia et al., 2008; Weitzel et al., 2019).

Given the importance of risk-taking for financial professionals, surprisingly few studies investigate whether their market experience makes them less prone to related biases than non-professionals. To shed light on this issue, we run two non-incentivized and well established experiments used for analyzing biases in risk-taking plus one additional experiment on the narrow framing bias to test for the strength of potential biases in decisions involving risk. To get a comprehensive picture, we vary the decision domain (gain vs loss domain) and the context of the decision (non-monetary vs explicit finance context) in our experiments. First, we set up a slightly modified version of the classical Asian Disease problem from Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and Kahneman and Tversky (1984) for testing domain-dependent risk-taking in a general, non-monetary situation involving risk. Second, to analyze the role of domain-specific risk-taking in an explicit finance context, we conducted a classical choice problem in investment decisions.
(Shefrin and Statman, 1985). In an additional experiment, we confronted subjects with two simultaneous risky decisions, presented either in as two separate, or as a single, joint decision. Here, we ran a classical choice problem involving one risky lottery in the gain domain and one in the loss domain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). In total, 202 professionals covering a broad range of job functions in the US finance industry and 408 subjects from other US industries completed the online experiment.

First, we find that the outcome domain does affect risk-taking of both professionals and non-professionals in a non-monetary context. Second, we report different behavior of professionals and non-professionals in an explicit finance context. We show that professionals are significantly more likely to hold on to a losing than to a winning stock, a behavior we do not find among non-professionals. Finally, we observe that professionals are similarly prone to the narrow framing bias in risky decisions as non-professionals. Both groups select the dominated alternatives more frequently when they are presented separately (which potentially induces a cognitive narrow frame).

Our paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, we add to the large body of literature on domain-dependent risk-taking and decision making in general (see, for instance, Camerer et al. (1997) for reference point-dependent behavior of NYC cab drivers and Pope and Schweitzer (2011) for loss-averse behavior of professional golf players in tournaments on the PGA tour). We contribute with our study by showing that risk-taking is strongly influenced by the domain of the decision (gain vs loss) even for highly experienced market participants like financial professionals. We even find that domain effects on risk-taking are stronger among professionals compared to non-professionals in investment-related contexts. This might be explained by finance professionals being more reluctant to realize losses than non-professionals, because, for the former, paper losses might count less heavy than real and monetized losses.

Second, we add to the literature on the behavior of finance professionals and on the discussion whether real-world market experience can reduce or eliminate behavioral biases. As outlined
above, some studies attribute deviations from neoclassical theory to a lack of market experience (e.g., List, 2003, 2004), while other studies (e.g., Cherian and Jarrow, 1998; Ferraro et al., 2005) argue that economic theory might become self-fulfilling when economically more advanced individuals adopt the theory as a normative benchmark. In a paper closely related to ours, Sheffer et al. (2018) take this argument to politicians by administering non-incentivized experimental tasks to incumbents in Belgium, Canada, and Israel (some of the experiments were similar to ours). They show that politicians are as, or even more, prone to choice anomalies when compared to people from the general population. For instance, politicians exhibit a stronger tendency to escalate commitment when facing sunk costs and they show similar framing effects in risky decisions. Moreover, results of studies analyzing the role of financial professionals’ experience on their behavior are at best mixed, as professionals’ behavior is not systematically closer to predictions from neoclassical theory than the behavior of student or general population samples—see, for instance, Cipriani and Guarino (2009), Abdellaoui et al. (2013), Kirchler et al. (2018), and the findings of Deaves et al. (2010), Menkhoff and Schmeling (2013), and Pikulina et al. (2017) for studies showing that professionals exhibit herd behavior similar to student subjects, behave in line with Prospect Theory, exhibit strong rank-dependent risk-taking, and are overconfident with respect to their forecasting abilities, respectively. In contrast, some other studies suggest that professionals are less prone to anchoring than students (Kaustia et al., 2008) and produce price bubbles less frequently and with lower magnitude in laboratory asset markets (Weitzel et al., 2019). Turning to related literature on framing effects, it appears that such effects are not only present in non-finance domains (Druckman, 2001; Gächter et al., 2009), but also among financial planners (Roszkowski and Snelbecker, 1990) and finance professionals (Schwaiger et al., 2019). We contribute to this line of literature by providing first systematic evidence that professionals are consistently prone to domain-dependent risk-taking. Our data do not support the hypothesis that market experience promotes behavior that is more in line with neoclassical predictions. We even find stronger domain-dependent behavior and a more
pronounced disposition effect among professionals in investment decisions compared to non-professionals.

2 The Experiment

2.1 Experimental Procedure

The study was conducted online in the United States in May 2018 via Qualtrics. In total, 610 subjects completed the experimental battery. The sequence of the three experimental tasks was randomized across subjects to control for order effects. Our PROF sample consists of 202 financial professionals from different areas. The majority work as advisors or in sales (55.0%), followed by risk or portfolio managers (25.3%) and support functions (19.8%). Of the 408 subjects in the GEN sample of non-finance professionals, the most prominent sectors are services (43.1%), education (14.0%) and manufacturing and construction (13.0%). To contact these subjects, who cover a wide range of job functions in the finance industry and a broad sample across industries, we used proprietary contacts of www.before.world (Behavioral Finance Online Research) and the US database and services of an international market research firm. A detailed description of the job functions and industry sectors can be found in Appendix A.

The mean age of all subjects is 46.1 years, the gender composition is 50.7% males and 49.3% females. On average, it took subjects 11 minutes to complete the experiment. We paid one out of five participants (random draw) a flat fee of $25. We refrained from incentivizing each task separately, as the decision involving risk-taking in a general context (i.e., the Asian Disease Problem variant) inhibits monetary incentives (see also Sheffer et al. (2018) for applying a very similar approach with incumbents from various countries). In doing so, we closely follow the original studies of Tversky and Kahneman (1981), Kahneman and Tversky (1984), Shefrin and Statman (1985), and Tversky and Kahneman (1986).
2.2 Main Experimental Tasks

In the first experiment, we analyze the domain effect on risk-taking in a non-monetary context. In particular, we set up a between-subjects design, confronting half of the subjects with Experiment 1a (gain domain) and the other half with Experiment 1b (loss domain). We modified the Asian disease-problem of Tversky and Kahneman (1981) as follows to emulate a business-related cover story:

Experiment 1a and 1b (the introduction to the decision problem is the same for both groups). Imagine that the industry your company operates in struggles with a recession. 900 of your employees (out of 5,000) are endangered to lose their jobs if the weak development of the economic situation continues. You are now instructed to decide between two alternative programs to avert the worst case of all 900 employees losing their jobs. Which program do you prefer?

Experiment 1a.

Adopt Program A: 300 employees will keep their jobs.

Adopt Program B: there is a one-third probability that 900 employees will keep their jobs and a two-thirds probability that no one will keep their job.

Experiment 1b.

Adopt Program A: 600 employees will lose their jobs.

Adopt Program B: there is a one-third probability that nobody will lose their job and a two-thirds probability that 900 employees will lose their jobs.

In the second experiment, we analyze potential domain-specific risk-taking in an explicit finance context by confronting subjects with the classical stock selling problem proposed by
Shefrin and Statman (1985). To address both the gain and loss domain, we modified the task slightly to establish a between-subjects design where each subject faces one of the following two choice problems.

Experiment 2a. Imagine you have purchased a stock one month ago for $100 and now it is selling at a price of $110. You now must decide whether to realize the gain or hold the stock for one more period. (Assume, for simplicity, that there are no taxes or transaction costs.) You further expect that in the upcoming period the stock will either increase in price by $10 or decrease in price by $10 with equal probability (50/50 chance).

Experiment 2b. Imagine you have purchased a stock one month ago for $100 and now it is selling at a price of $90. You now must decide whether to realize the loss or hold the stock for one more period. (Assume, for simplicity, that there are no taxes or transaction costs.) You further expect that in the upcoming period the stock will either increase in price by $10 or decrease in price by $10 with equal probability (50/50 chance).

Subjects were then asked to indicate whether they would sell the stock (i.e., choose the riskless alternative, as this choice precludes further gains or losses) or hold it one more period (i.e., choose the risky alternative with an increase or decrease of $10 with equal probability). While neoclassical models would view the decision problems as almost identical and predict risk aversion in both experiments, Prospect Theory predicts subjects to behave risk-averse in Experiment 2a and risk seeking in Experiment 2b.

\[2\] At the time of the decision, the only objective variation is the absolute difference of $20 in total wealth due to the higher or lower stock price.
Varying the contextual frames in which the choice problems are presented allows us to get a more comprehensive picture about potential differences in domain-specific risk-taking between financial professionals and the general population. In Experiment 1, we analyze domain-specific risk-taking in a primarily non-monetary context. We consciously build on a modified version of the Asian Disease Problem of Tversky and Kahneman (1981) as it directly addresses frame-induced domain effects and is set in a non-financial context. Within the general context of this decision problem, we analyze how a simple change in the description of the situation (with no differences in objective outcomes) affects the behavior of finance professionals and non-professionals. In Experiment 2, we investigate how outcome domains affect risk-taking in an explicit finance context that is related to investment decisions. To control for individual characteristics, we included questions about age and gender as well as self-assessed risk preferences in general and in finance-specific situations (based on the German Socio-Economic Panel SOEP by Dohmen et al. (2011)). Accounting for the potential influence of cognitive reflection skills on decision making in risky gambles (Frederick, 2005), we also included the extended cognitive reflection test (CRT) by Toplak et al. (2014).

3 Results

3.1 Experiment 1: Domain-Specific Risk-Taking in a Non-Monetary Business Context

Figure 1 depicts the fraction of subjects who chose the risky alternative in Experiment 1, separated for subject pool (GEN vs PROF) and domain (gain vs loss). We find a strong domain effect, as the percentage of subjects choosing the risky alternative increases from 29.4% (36.6%) to 52.9% (55.4%) for non-professionals (professionals). In Table 1, we provide logit models with RISKY_ALTERNATIVE as the dependent variable (1 if the risky alternative was selected, 0 otherwise). NEG_FRAME indicates the domain of the decision, PROF stands for professionals,
Figure 1: **Fraction of subjects choosing the risky alternative in the gain and in the loss domain in Experiment 1**: This figure depicts the fraction of subjects selecting the risky alternative, separated for the gain domain (left) and the loss domain (right) and separated for the general population sample (GEN) and professionals (PROF). Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. The “expected values” of the sure alternative and the risky alternatives are equal in both the gain and the loss domain.

and the interaction term PROF x NEG_FRAME measures the difference between the domain specific risk-taking of professionals and non-professionals. In column two, we additionally control for age, gender, self-assessed level of risk-taking in general RISK_GEN, and CRT score.³

We find a significant domain effect for both subject pools (see NEG_DOMAIN for subjects from the general population group and NEG_DOMAIN + PROF x NEG_DOMAIN for subjects from the group of financial professionals on the bottom of Table 1). This means that both professionals and non-professionals select the risky alternative more often in the loss domain (i.e., where the outcomes are described as jobs lost) than in the gain domain (i.e., where the outcomes are described as jobs saved), even though the decision problem is identical. Moreover, we do not find evidence for a difference in this domain effect between professionals and the general population (see the interaction term PROF x NEG_DOMAIN).

³As a robustness check, we also performed the regression with the self-assessed level of financial risk-taking, which does not alter the findings. Results can be provided upon request.
Table 1: **Risk-taking in the gain and in the loss domain in a general context in Experiment 1.** This table outlines decisions for the risky alternative depending on the domain (gain vs loss) and the subject pool. RISKY_ALTERNATIVE is a binary dummy taking on 1 if the risky alternative was selected and 0 otherwise. NEG_DOMAIN is a binary dummy standing for the domain of the decision, PROF stands for financial professionals, and PROF x NEG_DOMAIN is an interaction term measuring the difference between the domain specific risk-taking of professionals and non-professionals. In the second column, additional controls for age, gender, self-assessed level of risk-taking from the SOEP-question on risk-taking in general (RISKGEN), and CRT score are added. The test for the presence of a domain effect in the sub-sample of professionals, NEG_DOMAIN + PROF x NEG_DOMAIN, is presented on the bottom of the Table. *, ** and *** represent p-values below 5%, 1% and 0.1%, respectively, of a double-sided test. z-statistics are provided in parentheses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dep. var.: RISKY_ALTERNATIVE</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEG_DOMAIN</td>
<td>0.993***</td>
<td>1.009***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.77)</td>
<td>(4.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROF</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>0.401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.27)</td>
<td>(1.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROF x NEG_DOMAIN</td>
<td>-0.227</td>
<td>-0.268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.64)</td>
<td>(-0.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>FEMALE</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RISK_GEN</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRT</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.70)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Domain effect professionals**

| NEG_DOMAIN + PROF x NEG_DOMAIN | 0.767* | 0.741* |
|                               | (2.67) | (2.55) |

| N                             | 610    | 610    |
| Pseudo $R^2$                  | 0.039  | 0.048  |
3.2 Experiment 2: Domain-Specific Risk-Taking in a Finance Context

In the second experiment, we investigate how outcome domains affect risk-taking in an explicit finance context related to investment decisions. Figure 2 depicts the fractions of subjects who chose the risky alternative (i.e., hold the asset), separated for subject pool and domain. Interestingly, we find a much stronger domain effect among finance professionals than among the general population. While the percentage of non-professionals who chose the risky alternative only rises slightly from 66.0% in the gain domain to 70.2% in the loss domain, we find a substantial increase from 62.9% to 84.8% among professionals. Table 2 shows the results of a logit model with HOLD_ASSET as the dependent variable. In column two, we additionally control for age, gender, self-assessed level of financial risk-taking RISK_FIN, and CRT score.

![Figure 2: Fraction of subjects choosing the risky alternative (i.e., staying invested in the risky asset) in the gain and in the loss domain in Experiment 2](image)

This figure depicts the fraction of subjects selecting the risky alternative, separated for the gain domain (left) and the loss domain (right) and separated for the general population sample (GEN) and professionals (PROF). Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. The “expected values” of the sure alternative and the risky alternatives are equal in the gain and the loss domain, respectively.
As already indicated by Figure 2, we find no domain-specific risk-taking for the general population (dummy NEG_DOMAIN), but we do find a significant domain-specific risk-taking for financial professionals (NEG_DOMAIN + PROF x NEG_DOMAIN). As can be seen from the interaction term PROF x NEG_DOMAIN, the difference in the domain effect between financial professionals and the general population is also significant.

These findings are remarkable as they emphasize the peculiarity of realizing potential losses for financial professionals. Turning to the control variables, we find a significant effect for age and evidence for a gender effect, indicating that older subjects and women are more likely to stay invested.

While the result that finance professionals are more prone to risk-taking in the loss domain than non-professionals seems surprising at first, we conjecture that there might indeed be an occupational bias behind it. The results can be interpreted such that financial professionals are more reluctant to realize paper losses and hence more willing to hold assets after incurring a loss with respect to the purchase price than non-professionals.
Table 2: Risk-taking in the gain and in the loss domain in a finance-related context in Experiment 2. This table outlines decisions for the risky alternative (i.e., hold the asset) depending on the domain (gain vs loss) and the subject pool. HOLD\_ASSET is a binary dummy taking on 1 if the risky alternative was selected and 0 otherwise. NEG\_DOMAIN is a binary dummy standing for the domain of the decision, PROF indicates financial professionals, and PROF x NEG\_DOMAIN is an interaction term measuring the difference between the domain specific risk-taking of professionals and non-professionals. In the second column, additional controls for age, gender, self-assessed level of risk-taking from the SOEP-question on financial risk-taking (RISK\_FIN), and CRT score are added. The test for the presence of a domain effect in the sub-sample of professionals, NEG\_DOMAIN + PROF x NEG\_DOMAIN, is presented on the bottom of the Table. Numbers of observations are 200 (97) for GEN (PROF) in Experiment 2a, and 208 (105) for GEN (PROF) in Experiment 2b. *, ** and *** represent p-values below 5%, 1% and 0.1%, respectively, of a double-sided test. z-statistics are provided in parentheses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dep. var.: HOLD_ASSET (risky alternative)</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEG_DOMAIN</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>0.305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.91)</td>
<td>(1.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROF</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
<td>-0.244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.53)</td>
<td>(-0.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROF x NEG_DOMAIN</td>
<td>0.996*</td>
<td>0.875*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.46)</td>
<td>(2.13)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.27)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMALE</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(2.65)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RISK_FIN</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRT</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.77)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Domain effect professionals**

| NEG\_DOMAIN + PROF x NEG\_DOMAIN         | 1.189** | 1.179** |
|                                          | (3.46)  | (3.38)  |

| N            | 610     | 610     |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | 0.022   | 0.050   |


3.3 Experiment 3: Domain Effects and Narrow Framing

In an additional experiment, we seek to analyze the strength of potential domain effects on risk-taking. In particular, we are interested whether domain specific risk attitudes can relate to irrational decisions among finance professionals. To this end, we build on the narrow framing task proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1981). Here, subjects are presented two simultaneous risky decisions, one of which is set in the gain domain while the other is set in the loss domain. The two decisions are parameterized such that acting risk-averse in the gain domain and, simultaneously, risk-seeking in the loss domain leads to the selection of a dominated pair of alternatives. While in the above experiments domain-specific risk-taking does not allow inference about the rationality of the individual choices, in this decision problem it comes at the immediate cost of selecting a dominated alternative.

Tversky and Kahneman (1981) have shown that student subjects who are presented the two decisions separately largely fail to put the decisions in a common context (narrow framing bias) and hence choose the dominated pair of alternatives. In Experiment 3, we test whether finance professionals also fall prey to the narrow framing bias.

We thus confronted half of the subjects with the two decisions separately (Experiment 3a) and the other half with a single, joint formulation of the decision problem (Experiment 3b).

Experiment 3a. The company you work for is operating in two markets. Imagine that you face the following pair of concurrent decisions for both markets.
Market 1

Option A: Sure gain of $2,400,000.

Option B: 25% chance to gain $10,000,000 and 75% chance to gain nothing.

Market 2

Option A: Sure loss of $7,500,000.

Option B: 75% chance to lose $10,000,000 and 25% chance to lose nothing.

Subjects could then indicate their choices for the two markets.

In this experiment, choosing Option A in Market 1 and Option B in Market 2 is strictly dominated by choosing Option B in Market 1 and Option A in Market 2. Decision makers who are generally risk-averse in the gain domain and risk averse in the loss domain might fail to realize this observation more easily when they evaluate each situation separately. To control for unobserved reasons why subjects would choose the dominated alternative, we presented the other half of the subjects with the joint decision problem in Experiment 3b. This task offers the dominated combination (B in Market 2 and A in Market 1) and the dominating combination (B in Market 2 and A in Market 1) from the previous experiment as alternatives.

Experiment 3b. The company you work for is operating in two markets. Imagine that you face the following pair of concurrent decisions for both markets.

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4When facing both decisions simultaneously, the contingent payoffs of the choices in Markets 1 and 2 can be aggregated. Consequently, the decision problem with two questions and two choice alternatives each can be interpreted as one single decision with four choice alternatives. Then, choosing Option A in Market 1 and Option B in Market 2 yields a 25% chance to win $2,400,000 and a 75% chance to lose $7,6000,000. This choice alternative is strictly dominated by choosing Option B in Market 1 and Option A in Market 2, which yields a 25% chance to win $2,500,000 and a 75% chance to lose $7,500,000. Failure to assess this correctly is interpreted as a result of the narrow framing bias, as the decision maker overlooks to aggregate the potential outcomes of his decisions correctly.
Option A: 25% chance to gain $2,400,000 and 75% chance to lose $7,600,000.

Option B: 25% chance to gain $2,500,000 and 75% chance to lose $7,500,000.

In Table 3 we provide a logit model with DOMINATED_ALTERNATIVE as the dependent variable (a binary variable taking on 1 if the dominated alternative was selected and 0 otherwise), showing the effect of narrow framing on the frequency with which the dominated alternative is chosen. SEPARATE is a binary dummy taking on 1 if the decision problem consisted of two separate choices (Experiment 3a) and 0 if the decision consisted of one choice of aggregated outcomes (Experiment 3b). As can be seen from the coefficient SEPARATE and the linear combination SEPARATE + PROF x SEPARATE, we find a strong and significant narrow framing effect for both subgroups that stays robust after including the usual control variables. Moreover, we do not find a significant difference in the this effect between professionals and non-professionals (as indicated by PROF x SEPARATE). These findings suggest that professionals are similarly prone to narrow framing (i.e., selecting the dominated alternatives more frequently when presented separately) as non-professionals.\[5\]

\[5\]Interestingly, we observe a substantial fraction of irrational choices in Experiment 3a: in total, 54.1% of all subjects chose the dominated combination of option A in Market 1 and option B in Market 2. This fraction is slightly, but insignificantly, lower in the general population sample (52.2%) than in the group of financial professionals (57.8%).
Table 3: **Choice of the dominated alternative with and without narrow framing.** This table outlines decisions for the dominated alternative when the outcomes are presented as two separate decisions compared to when they are already aggregated in the problem formulation. **DOMINATED_ALTERNATIVE** is a binary dummy taking on 1 if the dominated alternative was selected and 0 otherwise. **SEPARATE** is a binary dummy taking on 1 if the decision problem consisted of two separate choices (Experiment 3a) and 0 if the decision consisted of one choice of aggregated outcomes (Experiment 3b). **PROF** stands for financial professionals, and **PROF x SEPARATE** is an interaction term measuring the difference between the frame specific choices of professionals and non-professionals. In the second column, self-assessed level of risk-taking from the SOEP-question on risk-taking in general (**RISK_GEN**), and **CRT** score are added. The test for the presence of a domain effect in the sub-sample of professionals, **SEPARATE + PROF x SEPARATE**, is presented on the bottom of the Table. Numbers of observations are 203 (100) for GEN (PROF) in Experiment 3a, and 205 (102) for GEN (PROF) in Experiment 3b. *, ** and *** represent p-values below 5%, 1% and 0.1%, respectively, of a double-sided test. \(z\)-statistics are provided in parentheses.

| Dep. var.: DOMINATED_ALTERNATIVE (1) (2) | (1)  
|---|---|
| SEPARATE | 1.180***  
| PROF | -0.116  
| PROF x SEPARATE | 0.345  
| AGE | -0.011  
| FEMALE | 0.054  
| RISK_FIN | 0.070  
| CRT | -0.061  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narrow framing effect professionals</th>
<th>(1) (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| SEPARATE + PROF x SEPARATE | 1.525***  
| N | 610  
| Pseudo \(R^2\) | 0.071  

---
4 Conclusion

Initiated with the seminal studies by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992), a large body of literature shows that decision makers are influenced by the domain (gain vs loss) in which the decision is embedded. However, some authors conjecture that real-world market experience would match predictions from neoclassical models more closely, leaving these findings as some kind of artefact of non-professional (student) subjects (e.g., List, 2003, 2004). In the present paper, we investigated whether real-world market experience can mitigate domain-specific risk-taking. In particular, we ran lab-in-the-field experiments with 202 financial professionals and 408 subjects from the general population and analyzed their behavior in classical experiments taken from Tversky and Kahneman (1981), Kahneman and Tversky (1984), Shefrin and Statman (1985), and Tversky and Kahneman (1986).

First, we reported a strong effect of domain-specific risk-taking for both professionals and non-professionals in a general, non-monetary decision problem. In particular, we found that risk-taking is higher in the loss domain compared to the gain domain. Importantly, we observed this pattern in a situation where we only altered the frames of an otherwise identical underlying decision problem, indicating the strength of the domain effect: In a variant of the Asian Disease Problem, we found that both professionals and non-professionals took more risk when the alternatives were framed as losses. Second, we observed a substantial difference between professionals and non-professionals when the decision problem was set in a finance context in a hypothetical investment situation. Here, professionals held on to a losing stock more eagerly (i.e., they selected the risky alternative more often) than non-professionals. This result is in contrast to the conjecture that experience in investment decisions mitigates the disposition effect and, to the contrary, suggests that professionals are more reluctant to realize (and therefore monetize) losses than non-professionals. Finally, we observed that professionals were similarly prone to
the narrow framing bias in risky decisions as non-professionals, which further corroborates the strength of the domain effect on decision making in situations involving risk.

Interestingly, our findings of persistent domain-specific risk-taking among professionals and particularly the insights that professionals ride losing stocks even longer than non-professionals are in contrast to studies showing that market experience reduces or eliminates behavioral biases (List, 2003, 2004). Instead, our results are in line with literature showing that financial professionals do not behave more in accordance with neoclassical predictions compared to non-professionals like students or people from the general population (Cipriani and Guarino, 2009; Deaves et al., 2010; Abdellaoui et al., 2013; Menkhoff and Schmeling, 2013; Kirchler et al., 2018; Sheffer et al., 2018; Schwaiger et al., 2019). Our findings are also in line with studies exploiting field data which show that decision makers exhibit reference point dependent behavior (Camerer et al., 1997) and are prone to loss aversion (Pope and Schweitzer, 2011) in their daily (professional) decisions. Given the importance of this topic, we hope that researchers gain more and more insights into the behavior of finance professionals to get a more comprehensive picture of their behavior and to be able to identify if and where they do come closer to neoclassical benchmarks. As a related point, additional research on professionals’ behavior should also focus on isolating the drivers of potential differences to the behavior of non-professionals.

Finally, our study has certain limitations. One criticism could center around the non-incentivized nature of our experiments. We are aware of this issue and we weighed the advantages and disadvantages of not incentivizing the experiments carefully while planning the study. The reason why we have opted for not incentivizing the tasks was twofold: first, we wanted to cover a wider range of risky decisions and therefore selected tasks spanning from a variant of the general Asian Disease Problem (Experiment 1) to an explicit investment decision in a finance context (Experiment 2). Second, we aimed to stick as closely as possible to the original studies to avoid potential confounds from a variation in the incentive schemes, and therefore also opted for not incentivizing the experiments.
References


Weitzel, Utz, Christoph Huber, Jürgen Huber, Michael Kirchler, Florian Lindner, Julia Rose.

Online Appendix

A  Industry sectors and job functions

Table A1 shows the distribution of industry sectors among the subjects not working in finance and the distribution of specific job functions among financial professionals.

Table A1: **Distribution of sectors among the general population sample and job functions among the financial professionals sample.** This table outlines sectors subjects from the general population are employed at and it shows job functions of the financial professional.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GEN, sector</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, forestry &amp; fishing</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business &amp; other services</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>18.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>13.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and social work</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>11.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels &amp; Catering</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT services</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>12.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining &amp; Utilities</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROF, function</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analysis/research/valuation</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Client advisor</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customer support</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>20.79</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investment advisor</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment banking</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portfolio management</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk management</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>22.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trading/brokerage</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B Details on the Experimental Tasks

B.1 CRT and Risk Attitudes

**Cognitive Reflection Test.** Cognitive reflection tests are designed to measure subjects’ ability to consciously reflect on their intuitive responses. These types of tests were first established by Frederick (2005) and have been used widely since. To avoid potential recognition effects by the subjects, we decided to use the extended cognitive reflection test proposed by Toplak et al. (2014). Each question has been displayed on a separate screen; the order has been randomized to avoid order effects. In particular, the test is comprised of the following seven questions [correct answers in parentheses]:

- If you can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and your friend can drink one barrel of water in 12 days, how long would it take you to drink one barrel of water together (in days)? [4]

- In school you received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. How many students are in the class? [29 students]

- You buy a share for $60, sell it for $70, buy it back for $80, and sell it finally for $90. How much money have you made? [$20]

- In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake (in days)? [47]

- You are about to buy a ticket for a concert and a train ticket to get there which together cost $110. You know that the ticket for the concert costs $100 more than the train ticket. How much does the train ticket alone cost? [$5]
• You know that 5 workers of your department are able to finish 5 projects in 5 hours. How long do 10 workers need to finish 10 projects (in hours)? [5]

• You decided to invest $8,000 in the stock market. Six months after you invested the stock you had purchased were down 50%. Fortunately for you in the following 6 months the stocks you purchased went up 75%. At this point, you: (A) Broke even in the stock market. (B) Are ahead of where you began. (C) Have lost money. [C]

Self-Assessed Risk Attitudes. We use the following SOEP-questions to elicit subjects’ self-assessed risk attitudes in general and in financial decisions.

• How do you see yourself: Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?

• People can behave differently in different situations. How would you rate your willingness to take risks in financial matters?

In both questions, subjects are asked to indicate their self-assessment on a 7-item Likert scale ranging from not at all willing to take risks to very willing to take risks.
B.2 Instructions of the Experiment

Introductory Screen

Welcome

We are researchers from several universities conducting a study on your personal opinions and attitudes.

Participation will take less than 15 minutes and with your participation can earn money: one in five participants will receive $25. At the end of the data collection (in about three weeks), a random draw will determine whether you are one of those that are paid out. In this case, you will receive your payout in points which you can cash in and retrieve via PayPal or other methods.

With your participation, you will make an important contribution to research. All data will be depersonalized and will only be used for scientific purposes. This study adheres to the principles of economic experiments: participants are not deceived and earnings are paid out for real.

Thank you very much for participating!

Domain-Specific Risk-taking, General Context (Gain/Loss Domain)

Imagine that the industry your company operates in struggles with a recession. 900 of your employees (out of 5,000) are endangered to lose their jobs if the weak development of the economic situation continues. You are now instructed to decide between two alternative programs to avert the worst case of all 900 employees losing their jobs. Which program do you prefer?

- Adopt Program A: 300 employees will keep their jobs.
- Adopt Program B: there is a one-third probability that 900 employees will keep their jobs and a two-thirds probability that no one will keep his/her job.

Imagine that the industry your company operates in struggles with a recession. 900 of your employees (out of 5,000) are endangered to lose their jobs if the weak development of the economic situation continues. You are now instructed to decide between two alternative programs to avert the worst case of all 900 employees losing their jobs. Which program do you prefer?

- Adopt Program A: 600 employees will lose their jobs.
- Adopt Program B: there is a one-third probability that nobody will lose his/her job and a two-thirds probability that 900 employees will lose their jobs.
Domain-Specific Risk-taking, Finance Context (Gain/Loss Domain)

Imagine you have purchased a stock one month ago for $100 and now it is selling at a price of $110. You now must decide whether to realize the gain or hold the stock for one more period. (Assume, for simplicity, that there are no taxes or transaction costs.)

You further expect that in the upcoming period the stock will either increase in price by $10 or decrease in price by $10 with equal probability (50/50 chance).

Now please decide between the following two options:

- Sell the stock now.
- Hold the stock one more period.

Imagine you have purchased a stock one month ago for $100 and now it is selling at a price of $90. You now must decide whether to realize the loss or hold the stock for one more period. (Assume, for simplicity, that there are no taxes or transaction costs.)

You further expect that in the upcoming period the stock will either increase in price by $10 or decrease in price by $10 with equal probability (50/50 chance).

Now please decide between the following two options:

- Sell the stock now.
- Hold the stock one more period.
Narrow Framing (Separate/Joint Decision)

The company you work for is operating in two markets. Imagine that you face the following pair of concurrent decisions for both markets.

**Market 1**
Option A: Sure gain of $2,400,000.
Option B: 25% chance to gain $10,000,000 and 75% chance to gain nothing.

**Market 2**
Option A: Sure loss of $7,500,000.
Option B: 75% chance to lose $10,000,000 and 25% chance to lose nothing.

Which option do you prefer for Market 1?
- A
- B

Which option do you prefer for Market 2?
- A
- B

The company you work for is operating in two markets. Imagine that you face the following pair of concurrent decisions for both markets.

Option A:
25% chance to gain $2,400,000 and 75% chance to lose $7,600,000.

Option B:
25% chance to gain $2,500,000 and 75% chance to lose $7,500,000.

Which option do you prefer for both markets?
- A
- B
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Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Among Finance Professionals

Abstract
Risk-assessment and risk-taking in various forms are among the most important tasks financial professionals face in their daily work. A large body of experimental studies has shown a substantial effect of the decision domain (gain vs loss domain) on risk-taking, predominantly among students. In a series of experiments set in different contextual frameworks, we investigate whether this domain effect is also present among experienced finance professionals and compare their decisions with people from the general population. Our results show that employees in the finance industry are equally prone to the domain effect in risk-taking than the general population. Interestingly, for domain-specific risk-taking in a finance context, we find that professionals are more reluctant to sell loser stocks than non-professionals.