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# Provision of Public Goods: Unconditional and Conditional Donations from Outsiders

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#### Abstract

Public goods often benefit a larger group than those who can actively provide them. This paper addresses institutional arrangements between subjects who can provide a public good (insiders) and subjects who also benefit from the public good but cannot provide it (outsiders) due to technical, physical or institutional reasons. Using laboratory experiments, we compare a setting of passive outsiders to situations where outsiders can either make unconditional or conditional transfers to the group of insiders. The primary behavioral questions are to what extent outsiders will use the opportunity to subsidize the contributions of insiders and how insiders will respond to those subsidies. In summary, outsiders make transfers to insiders, but there is little evidence of reciprocal increases in contributions by insiders to transfers offered. Indeed, provision levels of the public good across decision periods are lower than the baseline condition, where there are no opportunities for transfers from outsiders.

Keywords: Public good, Institution, Externality, Laboratory Experiment.

JEL Classification: D70, H41, C92

#### **1** Introduction

The provision of public goods often originates in a subset of a population (insiders) who can provide the public good while its benefits extend to a broader community. That is, there exist a set of individuals who benefit from the public good but cannot directly participate in its provision (outsiders) for physical, institutional or other reasons. This strategic environment characterizes the properties of many settings related to the provision of ecosystem services, where efforts that only some can undertake result in widespread conservation benefits. Examples include efforts to conserve biodiversity or forest management to retain soil and water, among others.

In some situations outsiders are completely passive bystanders. Previous experimental research has investigated the influence on provision levels from the presence of outsiders of this type (Delaney and Jacobson, 2014; Engel and Rockenbach, 2011; Engel and Zhurakhovska, 2014). However, in other situations outsiders have the opportunity to support the actions of insiders. This paper focuses on two institutions that can shape such opportunities, namely unconditional transfers that are de facto donations and conditional transfers where realized transfers are contingent upon the public goods provision by the insiders. The two institutions are based on transfers that are received by the insiders at the group level and evenly shared. Thus, we abstract from discretional payments targeted to individual insiders. This approach is based on the observation that in many situations in the field, monitoring the individual insiders' behavior is not feasible or too costly. The primary research question is to what extent outsiders make use of transfers, and how insiders respond to the decisions of outsiders. To the best of our knowledge this is the first experimental study designed to analyze the behavioral properties of institutional variations of this type.

Conditionality is a critical design attribute of transfer programs aimed at enhancing public good contributions by insiders. For example, proponents of payments for ecosystem services stress the relevance of guaranteeing conditionality for the design of successful conservation programs (Engel, 2016; Ferraro, 2011; Ferraro and Kiss, 2002). Yet, many such programs fail to implement conditional payments due to limitations on monitoring capacity or scientific uncertainty (Engel, 2016; Kinzig et al., 2011). By investigating behavioral responses to conditional and unconditional transfers, this study provides evidence of the relative performance of these two alternative institutions as compared to a baseline where outsiders are passive and cannot subsidize the actions of insiders.

# 2 Related literature

Broadly speaking the relevant literature most closely associated with this study falls into two main categories. The first category relates to studies that examine situations in which externalities are imposed on passive outsiders through actions of insiders. The second category relates to studies that examine the behavioral response to use of positive incentives to induce cooperative behavior.

#### 2.1 Literature related to externalities to outsiders

Compared to the large literature on social dilemma interactions, there are relatively few studies of the type examined here that involve externalities from one distinct group being passed on to a second distinct group. Among the existing studies, Engel and Rockenbach (2011) examine public good settings where contributions impose negative, positive, or zero externalities on a passive group of outsiders, maintaining the condition that provision of the public good is pro-social at the aggregate level. The sign of the externality varies in combination with the initial endowment of outsiders such that insiders might be initially richer, poorer or equally endowed as outsiders. The results of this study suggest that the presence of an outside group enhances the social dilemma, significantly reducing insiders' contributions to the public good if they face a risk of falling behind outsiders in terms of individual payoffs. The authors attribute this finding to an interaction of conditional cooperation and inequity aversion.

Two related studies address the relevance of social distance and communication in strategic settings where insiders impose negative externalities on outsiders. Delaney and Jacobson (2014) vary the degree of contact between the two groups in a setting where the negative externalities on outsiders are sufficiently large such that the provision of the public good is anti-social. They find that greater contact between insiders and outsiders entails a reduction in cooperation among insiders, decreasing the negative externalities on outsiders. Schwartz-Shea and Simmons (1990) examine a prisoner's dilemma with negative externalities on outsiders from a different perspective. They test the effect of communication among insiders, showing that it leads to greater cooperation among insiders, thus increasing the externalities on outsiders and decreasing overall efficiency.

The experimental literature examining intergenerational settings can also be interpreted from the perspective of insiders creating externalities on outsiders. Specifically, in such studies, the decisions of a current group of players may reduce the payoffs of the group of players that follow. For example, Hauser et al. (2014) study an intergenerational game where a given generation can extract a resource to exhaustion to maximize their own payoff, or leave some portion of the resource for the next generation (outsiders). Their primary finding is that a minority of subjects extract at high levels, resulting in resource exhaustion and inefficiencies in an intergenerational context. Yet, when extraction levels are democratically decided by a vote, the resource is sustained and available for the next generation. Similarly, Sherstyuk et al. (forthcoming) compare outcomes in an intergenerational game, contrasting decisions in settings where groups (generations) change across a sequence of games compared to a long-lived setting with a single group. Their results support the finding that achieving efficiency is more challenging in the intergenerational game. This outcome is associated with a lack of sufficient concern over following groups, as well as the increased strategic uncertainty of the intergenerational decision-setting.

In addition to the studies discussed above that examine insider-outsider settings with groups of individuals, various studies focus on settings in which the relevant interaction is between individuals. Supporting the findings of Sherstyuk et al. (forthcoming), Bland and Nikiforakis (2015) stress the relevance of strategic uncertainty in coordination failure in a two-person coordination game with externalities to a third party (regardless of whether they are positive or negative externalities) as compared to a setting without externalities. The authors attribute this result to the uncertainty by each of the two active players (insiders) regarding the value the other active player places on the welfare of the third-party.

Additionally, the results in Ellman and Pezanis-Christou (2010) show that the structure of decision making influences behavior towards a passive outsider, in line with the findings by Hauser et al. (2014) on the success of democratic voting rules already discussed. Ellman and Pezanis-Christou (2010) find that horizontal structures, where choices are based on average proposals, are more likely to take into account outsider's payoffs, in comparison to vertical structures or horizontal structures that require consensus.

Lastly, Engel and Zhurakhovska (2014) stress the relevance of guilt aversion in dealing with externalities to outsiders. They explore behavior in a prisoner's dilemma with a passive third participant (outsider) who suffers a negative externality whenever

5

at least one of two active players (insiders) chooses to cooperate. Cooperation is found to decrease when an outsider is harmed and inversely related to the level of harm.<sup>1</sup>

#### 2.2 Literature related to Positive Incentives

From the perspective of institutional analysis, this study also contributes to the experimental literature on the use of positive incentives on groups of agents to subsidize desired strategies. The question of whether extrinsic positive incentives can modify behavior has a long tradition in economics and recent studies aim to narrow it down to when and why these incentives work in specific situations. Gneezy et al. (2011) provide an excellent review on this issue focusing on how extrinsic incentives may come into conflict with other (psychological) motivations. In what they refer to as pro-social behavior, the authors discuss crowding-out effects that may emerge when extrinsic incentives undermine social norms of trust (by signaling distrust, external control or monitoring), alter the frame of the social interaction in a manner that weakens social norms or beliefs about the cooperative behavior of others, and reduce image motivation.

Focusing on the use of non-contingent extrinsic incentives, Falk (2007) shows that enclosing non-contingent gifts (a postcard drawn by children) to a contribution request by a charitable organization was effective in increasing donations, and donations increased with the value of the gift. More specifically related to our research question, Gneezy and Rey-Biel (2014) compare contingent and non-contingent incentives. They find support for the finding in Falk (2007) by showing that even small non-contingent monetary payments can raise effort compared to no payment. However, in line with

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Additional strategic environments that are not characterized as social dilemmas, but include the presence of outsiders, include ultimatum games (Güth and Van Damme, 1998), lottery choice tasks (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2010), and bribery games (Abbink, 2005) among others.

Gneezy et al. (2011), they show that very small contingent payments may backfire and lower effort. Sefton et al. (2007) also support variable success of payments (rewards), in this case if these are not maintained throughout time. They investigate the effect of monetary rewards and sanctions within groups in a public goods game and find that they are initially successful in increasing contributions. However, rewards decline at a fast rate and are insufficient to sustain contribution levels above the baseline condition without the opportunity of rewards or sanctions.

There also exists a specific stream of literature that directly focuses on institutions designed to include positive incentives for enhancing ecosystem services. In this body of literature, exogenous "payments" to groups of agents that can provide a public good (insiders in our terminology) entail rewarding certain strategies based on preestablished institutional rules. In some studies, payments are tied to individual performance of players (Alpízar et al., 2015; Handberg and Angelsen, 2015; Midler et al., 2015; Narloch et al., 2012; Vollan, 2008), while in others the rewards are in form of collective payments to the group based on group contributions (Midler et al., 2015; Narloch et al., 2012). Narloch et al. (2012) and Midler et al. (2015) argue that when payments are conditional on group performance, such payments may increase the potential payoffs an individual can earn, as well as increase the expectations of cooperation by other group members, thus inducing higher cooperation. Similarly, matters of fairness may come into play in such contexts in defining the sharing rules of collective payments. Our study moves the literature on payments for ecosystem services away from exogenous payments provided by an external authority to settings that incorporate voluntary endogenous payments by the outsiders.

Finally, institutional analyses related to the interaction between givers and receivers of positive transfers have a long tradition when restricted to interactions between individual agents. In this sense, our work is also related to the experimental literature on gift exchange games (Akerlof, 1982) and trust games (Berg et al., 1995) where the sequential nature of the game provides opportunities for cooperation and reciprocity, but equilibrium predictions based on self-regarding preferences predict suboptimal outcomes.<sup>2</sup> Our implementation of unconditional transfers extends the one-to-one setting found in both the gift-exchange and trust-game literatures to a group-to-group public goods setting. This change fundamentally alters the strategic nature of the problem, incorporating strategic uncertainty within and between groups.

# **3** Decision settings and parameters

The decision setting is a linear public good game in which provision of the public good creates a positive externality to both insiders and outsiders. In all decision making groups there are two randomly assigned types of subjects,  $n_I$  insiders and  $n_o$  outsiders, where  $n_I = n_o = 4$ , for a total group size of 8.

The experiment begins with a baseline condition of 5 decision periods (Part 1) where insiders make provision decisions and outsiders are inactive, only receiving information on insiders' decisions. Part 1 is important because we are interested in institutional changes to environments in which there is a history in which insiders' contribution decisions affect outsiders. In addition, Part 1 allows subjects to become familiar with

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Two exceptions compare individual interactions to group interactions in trust games (Cox, 2002; Kugler et al., 2007). Yet, these studies allow for communication within groups to decide on a binding collective strategy thereby eliminating within-group strategic uncertainty. Cox (2002) find that groups are less trustworthy than individuals, while Kugler et al. (2007) find that groups are less trusting than individuals.

the public goods aspect of the decision setting, and allows for statistical control of group specific effects.

In each period of Part 1, each subject receives an endowment of w = 100Experimental Currency Units (ECUs) placed in their "Private Account". Each insider *i* privately decides how many  $g_i$  ECUs of his endowment to contribute to a "Group Account." Each ECU left in the Private Account earns the individual 1 ECU. Every ECU contributed to the Group Account yields a return of a = 0.4 ECUs for each insider and each outsider. This defines the Group Account as a pure public good with symmetric benefits to all subjects and incentives to free-ride among insiders.

Insiders' payoff function in Part 1 is given by a standard linear public goods game, as defined in equation 1. This describes a social dilemma for self-interested payoffmaximizing agents for a < 1 and  $(n_I + n_0)a > 1$ .

$$\pi_{Ii}^{Baseline} = w - g_i + aG \qquad \text{where } G = \sum_{k=1}^{n_I} g_i \text{ and } g_i \in [0, w] \tag{1}$$

Because outsiders are inactive in Part 1, their payoff function is given by:

$$\pi_{Oi}^{Baseline} = w + aG \tag{2}$$

The Nash equilibrium for self-interested payoff maximizing agents entails zero contributions to the public good by insiders. However, a broad range of previous research on social dilemma settings has shown that subjects make decisions that reflect complex and diverse motivations beyond simple self-income maximization (see Camerer, 2003; Camerer and Fehr, 2006; Chaudhuri, 2011; Ostrom and Walker, 2003). Some, but not all, of these motivations support models where subjects respond systematically to the private benefits of their actions and the magnitude of externalities imposed on others (Blanco et al., 2016; Goeree et al., 2002). Considering that subjects derive utility from cooperation (Chaudhuri, 2011) allows us to illustrate that incorporating simple social preferences in a utility function suffices to derive

comparative static responses to the treatment conditions in equilibrium. More complex, and perhaps more realistic, utility functions are feasible but not necessary to provide this result. In its simplest form, we can extend the payoff function in equation 1 to the utility function 1a:

$$U(\pi_i, g_i)_l^{Baseline} = w - g_i + aG + f(g_i)$$
(1a)

where f(0) = 0,  $f'(g_i) > 0$  and  $f''(g_i) < 0$ . This implies that some additional utility is gained from contributions to the Group Account with decreasing returns, so that the marginal increase in utility from cooperating decreases for higher levels of cooperation by subject *i*. Prior experimental research has shown that cooperation is a basic human motive (Brandts et al., 2004; Goeree et al., 2002; Henrich et al., 2001) and we would therefore expect that  $-g_i + f(g_i)$  is positive for positive levels of  $g_i$ , at least for a subset of the subjects in the population, resulting in positive contributions to the Group Account in equilibrium.<sup>3</sup>

In Part 2 subjects play the game for additional 10 decision periods where the action set of outsiders varies across treatments. In the *Baseline* treatment outsiders remain inactive and continue to only receive information on insiders' decisions, as in Part 1. In the *Donation* treatment outsiders have the option to make non-contingent monetary transfers to insiders. In the *Contract* treatment outsiders have the option of making monetary transfers to insiders that are contingent on insiders' aggregate contributions to the public good.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> In addition, Arifovic and Ledyard (2012), Holt and Laury (2008), and Isaac et al. (1994) consider additional modeling approaches that rationalize positive contributions in finitely repeated public-goods experiments including other-regarding preferences and forward-looking behavior (see Chaudhuri, 2011 for more references).

#### 3.1 Donation Treatment

Once the potential for transfers is included, the decision setting is a two-stage game. In the first stage each outsider *j* can make non-binding transfers,  $t_j$ , to the group of insiders, where  $t_i \in [0, w]$ . All transfers by outsiders are added together in a Transfer Account of size  $T = \sum_{i=1}^{n_0} t_j$ , which is then split equally among insiders. In the second stage, insiders observe the value of T and their equal share of transfers before making their contribution decisions. As in the *Baseline* treatment, each insider has the opportunity to free-ride on the public good contributions of other insiders, receiving a return of *a* for each ECU contributed to the public good. In addition, in this treatment insiders receive  $\left(\frac{1}{n_i}\right)T$  independent of their own contribution.

By design, transfers received by insiders cannot be directly used for contributions to the Group Account. That is, the maximum amount an insider can contribute to the public good is w, irrespective of the transfer received. Of course, for interior contribution levels to the public good, insiders can use transfers to substitute for or complement their own contributions. For example, suppose after observing an aggregate transfers  $\hat{T}$  by outsiders, insiders contribute  $G = \hat{T}$ . This outcome could be viewed by outsiders as one in which their transfers are strictly a substitute for insiders' contributions to the public good. Alternatively, suppose insiders' contributions are  $G = 2\hat{T}$ . Outsiders could interpret this outcome as one of pure reciprocity, where insiders match outsiders' efforts and both type of agents share the costs of the provision of the first-order public good equally.

The resulting payoff functions for insiders and outsiders are given in equations (3) and (4), respectively:

$$\pi_{li}^{Donation} = w - g_i + aG + \frac{1}{n_I}T$$
(3)

$$\pi_{Oj}^{Donation} = w + aG - t_j \tag{4}$$

Based on the modeling approach for the utility function 1a and assuming that outsiders derive utility from sending transfers generates the utility functions 3a and 4a:

$$U(\pi_{i}, g_{i})_{I}^{Donation} = w - g_{i} + aG + \frac{1}{n_{I}}T + f(g_{i})$$
(3a)

$$U(\pi_i, g_j)_0^{Donation} = w + aG - t_j + y(t_j)$$
(4a)

where y(0) = 0,  $y'(t_i) > 0$  and  $y''(t_i) < 0$ .

Ultimately, the impact transfers have on total contributions depends on the level of transfers offered by outsiders and the responsiveness of insiders to these offers. Clearly there are multiple behavioral motivations that come into play that could affect the responsiveness of insiders to transfers from outsiders and the responsiveness of outsiders to decisions by insiders. Our analysis focuses on two such behavioral responses, motivated by the prior public goods literature, which are not mutually exclusive. The first is based on reciprocal preference and the second is based on conditional reciprocal preferences.

**Hypothesis 1**: For any positive transfer by outsiders, investments to the Group Account in *Donation* are larger than in *Baseline*.

Unconditional transfers constitute a donation and might be understood as a signal of trust for which insiders exhibit reciprocal behavior by increasing contributions to the Group Account. This would entail  $\frac{\partial g_i}{\partial T} > 0$ , and therefore transfers could be viewed as contributions to a second-order public good. A reciprocal reaction of this type is documented for one-to-one interactions in ultimatum, gift-exchange, and trust games (for a coprehensive summary see Fehr and Schmidt, 2006).

**Hypothesis 2**: Unfulfilled expectations by insiders regarding transfers from outsiders reduce investments to the Group Account.

For transfer levels by outsiders that at least satisfy the expectations by insiders of transfers to be received, investments to the Group Account are as high in *Donation* than in *Baseline*. If alternatively insiders' prior expectations on outsiders' transfer levels  $T^E$  (based on social norms, experience, or other factors) are not fulfilled ( $T < T^E$ ), the reaction could be to lower their own contributions to the public good  $\left(\frac{\partial g_i}{\partial (T^E - T)} < 0\right)$ .

#### 3.2 Contract Treatment

Outsiders in the *Contract* treatment can make individual transfers to the Transfer Account that will be used to compensate insiders conditional on their collective contributions. We differentiate between *transfers offered* by the group of outsiders  $T = \sum_{i=1}^{n_0} t_i$  and *transfers received* by the group of insiders T'. T can be understood as available funds to reward the group of insiders and defines the maximum aggregate reward insiders can receive. T' is contingent on contributions to the first-order public good. As long as funds are available, every insider receives an equal share of  $\frac{1}{n_1}$  ECUs for each token any insider contributes to the Group Account. Once the Transfer Account is depleted, additional contributions to the Group Account good are not subsidized. In summary, if T < G, T' = T and if  $\geq G$ , T' = G. By design, in the case that T > G the transfers not distributed among insiders are returned to outsiders in proportion to their individual transfers,  $(T - G)\frac{t_j}{T}$ .

Note, as in the *Donation* treatment, in the *Contract* treatment each insider has the opportunity to free-ride on the contributions of other insiders by benefiting from the first-order public good and in addition obtain  $\left(\frac{1}{n_I}\right)T'$  independent of their own contribution. Yet, given the contingency of transfers in the *Contract* treatment, the value of T' depends on each insiders' contribution decision as long as T > G. Thus,

each insider's decision affects the "size of the pie" all insiders create, but does not alter the "share of the pie" each insider receives.

Individual payoffs are represented as:

$$if \ T > G \qquad \begin{cases} \pi_{Ii}^{Contract} = e_{I} - g_{i} + aG + \frac{1}{n_{I}}T' \\ \pi_{Oj}^{Contract} = e_{O} + aG - t_{j} + (T - G)\frac{t_{j}}{T} \end{cases}$$
(5)

$$if T \leq G \qquad \begin{cases} \pi_{Ii}^{Contract} = e_I - g_i + aG + \frac{1}{n_I}T\\ \pi_{Oj}^{Contract} = e_O + aG - t_j \end{cases}$$
(7)

Hypothesis 3 is based on two differences between the payoff functions in the *Donation* and *Contract* treatments. First, given our parameterization of a = 0.4, as long as  $T \ge G$  in the *Contract* treatment, the individual marginal value of contributions to the first-order public good for insiders is 0.65. Thus, in this situation the marginal incentives for insiders' contributions are higher than in the *Baseline* and *Donation* treatments. Second, as in the *Donation* treatment, outsiders have an incentive to free-ride on other outsiders. An important difference, however, is that the conditional transfers in the *Contract* treatment are less risky for outsiders than in the *Donation* treatment in the sense that outsiders' transfers only subsidize insiders if insiders' actions warrant the transfer. Therefore, this effect could induce higher transfers in the *Contract* treatment are treatment.

**Hypothesis 3**: Investments to the Group Account and transfers are higher in *Contract* than in *Donation*.

#### 3.3 Experimental Procedures

The instructions for both insiders and outsiders were read out loud. At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were told there would be two parts, but were only informed about the details of Part 2 after the completion of Part 1. The language used in the experiment was neutral. There were two groups, Type A and Type B. Types remain

unchanged during the experiment. Type A subjects made allocations to a Group Account. In Part 2, for the *Donation* and *Contract* treatments, Type B subjects could make transfers to a Transfer Account benefiting the group of Type A subjects, and this was common information.

By design, Type A and B subjects do not make simultaneous decisions. In order to guarantee anonymity and elicit first-order beliefs, inactive Type A players typed in the number of ECUs they expected in the Transfer Account and inactive Type B players their expectation on allocations to the Group Account.<sup>4</sup> Both insiders and outsiders received feedback after every period on the insiders' total allocation to the Group Account, own individual earnings, and – if applicable – the amount of transfers allocated to the Transfer Account and distributed among the insiders. Before making decisions in Part 1 or Part 2, subjects answered quizzes to check their understanding of the games (see Supplementary Materials for instructions). At the conclusion of the experiment subjects were asked to answer a short questionnaire.

Sessions were conducted at the University of Innsbruck EconLab in June 2015 using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) for programming and ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) for subject recruitment. Table 1 summarizes the composition of the experiment. Subjects were paid privately in Euros using a conversion rate of  $\in$  1 for every 200 ECUs. Sessions lasted for about an hour and participants earned an average of 12.24 Euros.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> In order to reduce the complexity of the instructions and the incentive structure of the experiment, we chose not to incentivize the forecasts.

Treatment	Number of	umber of Number of	
	subjects	groups	sessions
Baseline	72	9	3
Donation	64	8	3
Contract	72	9	3
	208	26	9

Table 1. Summary of experimental sessions


### 4 **Results**

For brevity, herein we refer to allocations to the Group Account as "contributions." Pooling across individual decisions, Figure 1 shows the evolution of average individual contributions (solid lines) and individual transfers (dashed lines) for Parts 1 and 2. In the *Contract* treatment, the analysis uses individual transfers offered  $\left(\frac{1}{n_I}T\right)$  in order to capture the intent of outsiders.

In Part 1 there is a significant difference in contributions between the groups in the *Donation* treatment and the other two treatments, which diminishes over time. We attribute these differences to specific group effects, as all subjects were recruited from the same subject pool, there were no differences in how Part 1 was presented to the subjects, nor did the subjects know about any details of Part 2. In addition, experimental sessions alternated across treatments. Importantly, towards the end of Part 1 differences in contributions across treatments are not significant and thus initial group specific effects disappear with repetition of the baseline condition.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Unless noted, unpaired t-tests are used for the comparison of means. For periods 4 and 5, the p-values for differences between *Baseline* and *Donation* are 0.17 and 0.42, respectively. Differences between *Baseline* and *Contract* are insignificant as well, p-values of 0.84 and 0.27.

Figure 1 Average individual contributions (solid lines) and transfers (dashed lines) offered over time




In Part 2, outsiders use the opportunity to make unconditional and conditional transfers to the insiders. In period 6, the average percentage of endowment transferred to insiders is 30% in the *Donation* treatment and 38% in the *Contract* treatment. In both treatments, transfers decay across periods.

Concurrent to the decline in transfers, as shown in Figure 1, contributions follow a declining trend after a restart effect at the beginning of Part 2 (a phenomenon common in public good experiments, see for example Andreoni, 1988). Across the decision periods in Part 2, average contributions in the *Baseline* (24.6%) exceed contributions in the two treatments that allow for transfers (p=0.00 for both comparisons). Average contributions in the *Donation* treatment (14.5%) and the *Contract* treatment (13.9%) are not significantly different (p=0.73).

Broadly speaking, there is very little evidence of reciprocal increases in contributions by insiders to transfers offered. The first period decisions of Part 2 are indicative to what was to follow. In period 6, contributions exceeded the amount offered in transfers in only 50% (11%) of the groups in the *Donation (Contract)* treatment. Including group decisions in all periods of Part 2, contributions exceeded transfers offered in only 40% (34%) of the periods in the *Donation (Contract)* treatment. Thus, on average we do not find evidence that insiders' contributions match or exceed outsiders' transfers. Instead, contributions are well below the level of transfers.

Remarkably, the fact that contributions are generally lower than transfers offered in the *Contract* treatment results in substantial underutilization of transfers offered. Across all groups and all periods of Part 2 in the *Contract* treatment, only 69% of transfers offered were utilized. Figure 2 shows, by decision period, the average transfers returned to outsiders as a percentage of transfers offered. In sum, despite the increase in marginal value of contributions to the first-order public good with conditional transfers, insiders systematically underutilize the transfers offered leading to a loss in efficiency.

Figure 2. Returned transfers as a fraction of transfers offered in the *Contract* treatment



In addition, period 6 provides evidence of the first and second order free riding that occurs within groups, with 17% (17%) of outsiders in the *Donation* (*Contract*) treatment making transfers of zero and 25% (25%) of insiders in the *Donation* (*Contract*) treatment making contributions of zero. By the end of Part 2, the percentage of outsiders making transfers of zero increases to 66% (64%) in the *Donation* (*Contract*) treatment and the percentage of insiders making contributions of zero increases to 63% (47%) in the *Donation* (*Contract*) treatment.

Table 2 presents results from random effects GLS regressions to test for treatment effects on individual insiders' contributions and individual outsiders' transfers offered. The results are consistent with the group level data reported above. Contributions are significantly lower in the *Donation* and *Contract* treatments relative to the *Baseline* treatment. A post-estimation Wald-test confirms that the difference in contributions between the *Donation* and *Contract* treatments is not statistically significant (p=0.90). Moreover, column 2 shows that the difference in individual transfers offered between

the reference category *Donation* and the *Contract* treatment is not statistically significant (p=0.13).

		Toutions and transfers
	(1)	(2)
	Contributions	Transfers Offered
	(Insiders)	(Outsiders)
Donation	-10.12**	
	(0.049)	
Contract	-10.75**	6.636
	(0.031)	(0.132) -2.772 <sup>***</sup>
Period	-2.143***	-2.772***
	(0.000)	(0.000) $40.96^{***}$
Constant	47.11***	40.96***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ν	1040	680
Number of subjects	104	68
R-squared (overall)	0.078	0.101
*	o 1 o **     o o <b>e</b> ***	0.01

 Table 2. GLS treatment effects for individual contributions and transfers offered

*p*-values in parentheses, p < 0.10, p < 0.05, p < 0.01

Baseline and Donation are the reference categories for (1) and (2) respectively.

We next turn to an examination of differences in individual groups across treatment conditions. Figure 3 displays group contributions and transfers for the Baseline, Donation, and Contract treatments respectively. As shown, within all three treatment conditions, there is considerable between-group variation, with some groups sustaining relatively high contribution levels while others contributing close to zero across decision periods. See for example the contrast in group Baseline 4 versus Baseline 8, Donation 6 versus Donation 8, and Contract 1 versus Contract 5.

Panel b of Figure 3 illustrates that in the Donation treatment there is a close correlation between transfers and contributions. There is no consistent pattern, however, of insiders contributing more than what they receive from outsiders. The exception is group Donation 8, where cooperation was high in Part 1. Even in this case, transfers do not induce cooperation to increase in Part 2 relative to Part 1. Panel c shows that in the Contract treatment, transfers offered by outsiders are generally well above contributions made by insiders for most groups and most clearly illustrated by groups *Contract 2-4.* As discussed above, this implies a substantial return to outsiders of the transfers they offered.






Figure 3. Individual group decisions by treatment, group contributions (solid lines) and transfers offered (dashed lines).





Focusing on individual contributions, Table 3 presents the results from multilevel regressions designed to examine the temporal dynamics of insiders' contributions in all treatments, with random effects on the group and subject level. The independent variables include the one-period lagged average contribution of the other insiders in the group and, for the *Donation* and *Contract* treatments, the individual share of transfers offered by the outsiders in the current period.

As shown in Table 3, in the *Baseline* treatment the lag of contribution of others is positive and significant, thus supporting conditional cooperation, common to other public goods experiments (e.g. Croson et al., 2005). This occurs even in the presence of outsiders who benefit from the public good without sharing in its provision. Interestingly, in neither the *Donation* nor the *Contract* treatment do we observe a significant effect related to other insiders' contributions. Further, in both the *Donation* and *Contract* treatments the individual share of transfers offered is positive and significant. At the margin, insiders increase their contributions by approximately 1/3 token for each token of transfer they are offered, suggesting a relatively weak reciprocal response to transfers offered by outsiders. The combination of these two effects

suggests that in these treatments, insiders' decisions are focused more on transfers offered, and less on contributions of other insiders.

The evidence that in both the *Donation* and *Contract* treatments subjects have a similar response to transfers offered has different implications for earnings across the two treatments. In the *Donation* treatment, the group of insiders pocket the difference between the share of transfer received and their increase in contributions. In the *Contract* treatment, this is not the case, as unused transfers are returned to the outsiders. **Table 3.** GLS temporal dynamics of insiders' contributions

	Contributions	Contributions	Contributions
	Baseline	Donation	Contract
Individual share of transfers	N/A	0.325***	0.329***
offered		(0.009)	(0.000)
Lagged average	$0.182^{**}$	0.006	0.118
contribution of others	(0.016)	(0.954)	(0.104)
Period	-2.492***	-0.700	-0.884**
	(0.000)	(0.143)	(0.013)
Constant	46.29***	17.90**	15.25***
	(0.000)	(0.023)	(0.006)
Ν	360	320	360
Number of subjects	36	32	36
Number of groups	9	8	9

*p*-values in parentheses, p < 0.10, p < 0.05, p < 0.01

To provide a more complete picture of the group dynamics, it is necessary to examine the drivers of transfers in more detail. Table 4 replicates Table 3, but for outsiders in the two treatments with a transfer option. The independent variables include the average individual contribution by insiders in the previous period, as well as the one-period lagged transfer of the other outsiders in an individual's group.

The results indicate that outsiders reciprocate higher contributions by insiders in the previous period by increasing their individual transfers. The magnitude of this response is, however, relatively small and similar in both treatments. For a one token increase in average individual contributions by insiders, an average outsider increases transfers by

about 0.3 tokens. This suggests weak reciprocal behavior. At the group level, this implies that increased contributions by 4 tokens result in an increase in transfers of 1.2, which is even lower than the positive externality each outsider receives from insiders' contributions, which equals  $0.4 \times 4 = 1.6$ .

Moreover, parallel to the results reported in Table 3, the effect of lagged average transfers of other outsiders is not significant. This suggests a tendency for outsiders to focus on the average contributions of insiders when making their transfer decisions, instead of the past decisions of other outsiders in their group. In addition, the larger intercept term for the *Contract* treatment, relative to the *Donation* treatment, reflects an underlying greater willingness to provide transfers in the *Contract* treatment, which is in line with the security that comes with knowing that transfers are returned if not met by contributions.<sup>6</sup>

Transfers Offered Transfers Offere	
Donation	Contract
$0.258^{***}$	0.218*
(0.004)	(0.095)
0.0829	0.0789
(0.364)	(0.420)
-1.270***	-1.724***
(0.004)	(0.002)
$18.88^{***}$	30.61 <sup>***</sup>
(0.003)	(0.000)
288	324
32	36
8	9
	Donation           0.258***           (0.004)           0.0829           (0.364)           -1.270***           (0.004)           18.88***           (0.003)           288           32

**Table 4.** GLS temporal dynamics of outsiders' transfers offered

*p*-values in parentheses, p < 0.10, p < 0.05, p < 0.01

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Although the intercept term in the *Contract* treatment is larger than in the *Donation* treatment, combining the two models of Table 4, and using interaction terms, provides a post-estimation Wald-test that reveals the difference between the two intercepts is not significant, p-value = 0.26.

# 5 Discussion, additional analyses and additional experiments

In summary, we observe positive responses from insiders with respect to the actions of outsiders, and *vice versa*. Contributions are positively correlated with higher transfers and transfers are positively correlated with higher contributions. However, consistent with the results from Sefton et al. (2007) in regard to use of within group rewards, transfers decline across decision periods and the positive correlation with contributions supports a cycle that reinforces the decline in both outcomes. As a result, we do not find support for Hypotheses 1 or 3. In sections 5.1 we examine the role of Hypothesis 3 in triggering the partial breakdown in cooperation. Section 5.2 provides results from additional experiments designed to explore the robustness of the initial results to changes in the structure of the experiment.

#### 5.1 The role of expectations

Insiders' unfulfilled expectations in the actions of outsiders, due to insufficient transfers, may lead to punishment of outsiders by insiders via reduced levels of contributions, and counter-punishment by outsiders in further reducing transfers. Previous studies have shown that subjects in laboratory experiments are more cooperative with other subjects who display strategies perceived to be fair (Fischbacher et al., 2001), use opportunities for costly punishment to punish norm violators (Fehr and Gächter, 2000), and display counter-punishment strategies (Nikiforakis, 2008).

However, our data does not support the conclusion that unfulfilled expectations are the main driver of the erosion of cooperation. Based on regression analyses available in Table A1 in the Appendix we do not find a significant relationship between contributions and the difference between expectations and actual offers of transfers. Thus, we do not find support for Hypothesis 2. Figure 4 provides an illustration of insiders' expectations of average individual transfers in comparison to actual transfers offered by outsiders. In period 6, average transfers offered are greater than average expectations in both the *Donation* and *Contract* treatments. However, following the low contributions by insiders in period 6, the outsiders rapidly decrease their transfers, which then become lower than expectations until the end of the sessions. Thus, following period 6, there is evidence of a deteriorating reciprocal relationship between insiders and outsiders.




Fig. 4 Expected and actual transfers

#### 5.2 Payoff differences between insiders and outsiders


After completing the initial experiments, we conjectured that the lack of strong reciprocity observed in the *Donation* and *Contract* treatments might possibly be driven by payoff-differences induced during Part 1 of the experiment. Engel and Rockenbach (2011) provide evidence that low cooperation levels for insiders in a setting with

positive externalities to outsiders can be related to an aversion to being behind in terms of payoffs. In our experimental design, because in Part 1 outsiders are passive bystanders that benefit from the contribution efforts of insiders, and because insiders begin the game with the same endowment as outsiders, insiders begin Part 2 with lower payoffs. Average aggregate payoffs for outsiders are about 25% higher than for insiders at the end of Part 1.

In order to examine to what extent the five decision periods of Part 1 may have affected the decisions in Part 2, we conducted two additional sessions where outsiders were allowed the opportunity to make unconditional transfers beginning with Period 1.<sup>7</sup> We refer to this additional treatment as *Donation II*. Figure 4 presents the contribution and transfer data from the original *Baseline* and *Donation* treatments, as well as *Donation II*. As shown, both contributions and transfers beginning in Part 1 of the *Donation II* treatment are at levels similar to those observed in Part 2 of the *Donation* treatments. No statistical difference is found between the two treatments (p=0.50 for contributions, p=0.69 for transfers). Thus, we conclude that payoff differences resulting from Part 1 in the original experiment are not a primary driver of lower contribution levels in the *Donation* and *Contract* treatments as compared to the *Baseline* treatment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> For these sessions, data was collected on 48 subjects comprising 6 groups. For consistency with the initial treatments, the instructions included a Part 1 and a Part 2. Subjects were told at the end of Part 1 that the game would continue for 10 more decision periods. Moreover, before making any decisions in one of the sessions, in addition to distributing and collecting control questions, we publicly reviewed the correct answers. Contributions and transfers in the two sessions are not significantly different.

Figure 5. Average individual contributions and transfers offered over time including the additional *Donation II* treatment



# 6 Conclusion

The results presented above for both the *Donation* and *Contract* treatments present a rather dismal outlook in regard to how transfer options might influence cooperation by insiders. Broadly speaking, there is almost no evidence of systematic cooperation between outsiders and insiders, whereby provision of the public good would be increased relative to the *Baseline* treatment as a result of an endogenous reciprocal relationship developing. In fact, on average, the existence of the institutions, namely the potential for transfers, is associated with a reduction in cooperation. The lack of cooperation in the *Contract* treatment is particularly remarkable. Despite the fact that, relative to the *Donation* treatment, insiders have a greater marginal incentive to make contributions to the public good, they do not contribute significantly more. This is in

contrast to previous studies that found a positive relationship between the MPCR and contributions to a public good (see for example Isaac and Walker, 1988) and occurs even though it implies the return of transfers to outsiders and a loss in efficiency.<sup>8</sup>

The lower contributions to the public good by insiders under the two institutions that allow for transfers (relative to the baseline where transfers were not an option) raises the question of how to interpret the erosion of cooperation observed across periods. We address several possible answers, namely the particular dynamics and associated payoff differences that occur between insiders and outsiders, the incentives to free-ride on other group members, and the strategic uncertainty that is inherent in the decision setting. These explanations alone, however, do not fully explain the reduced cooperation we observe under the institutions allowing for transfers.

At this point, we cannot explicitly identify the full set of mechanisms behind the decisions of insiders and outsiders that drive the poor performance of the unconditional and conditional transfers. Despite the fact that in all three treatment settings there are incentives for free-riding on one's sub-group, the relative performance of the *Donation* and *Contract* treatments as compared to the *Baseline* suggests that the introduction of the possibility of endogenous transfers accentuates the social dilemma.

One might conjecture that the poor performance of both conditional and unconditional transfers derives from the fact that some subjects could view the act of offering transfers as inappropriate (e.g. crowding-out). Building on Gneezy et al. (2011), one might speculate that the level of transfers offered by outsiders had the effect of eroding social norms of trust or altering the frame of the social interaction. As we

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The context for these earlier studies did not include the additional behavioral issues that might arise with insiders providing positive externalities to outsiders and the institutional option of transfers from outsiders.

observe a positive correlation between transfers offered and contributions, this raises the question of whether sufficiently large transfers would have induced higher contributions in the *Donation* and *Contract* treatments relative to the *Baseline*. But how much larger would transfers have to be? In period 6 we observe transfers to be higher than insiders' expectations of transfers. Yet, in most groups, these transfers were not sufficient to induce a temporal pattern of contributions and transfers that provided greater provision of the public good relative to the setting with no opportunities for transfers.

Alternatively, the limited cooperation between insiders and outsiders might be related to the use of an equal-share rule for allocating transfers to the insiders. This creates additional incentives for insiders to free-ride on the contributions of other insiders via the benefits from transfers. Thus, the egalitarian sharing rule could be perceived as unfair by some, undermining pro-social norms, and jeopardizing their effectiveness (Narloch et al 2012, Midler et al 2015). Sharing rules for transfers offered by outsiders that are based on the individual contributions of insiders might be perceived as fairer and result in more efficient outcomes. Support for this hypothesis is found for example in Burrows and Loomes (1994) who show that when abilities and opportunities are similar, people think that those putting in greater effort should get a higher reward.

The motivation of the two institutions examined in this study was to explore the use of transfers in prevalent field settings where individualizing transfers is not feasible or too costly to be cost effective. Our study suggests that making transfers by outsiders conditional on the group of insiders' actions is not sufficient; overall performance of the conditional transfer institution is poor. These results suggest the need for future

30

research that investigates the design attributes (or combination of attributes) of transfers from outsiders to insiders that are *necessary* and *sufficient* to enhance cooperation.

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# **Appendix – Additional Analyses**

	Contributions	Contributions	Contributions	Contributions
	Donation	Contract	Donation	Contract
Expectation higher than	-1.733	-0.287	N.A.	N.A.
transfer	(0.474)	(0.872)		
Expectation minus			-0.0705	-0.0193
individual transfer	N.A.	N.A.	(0.339)	(0.708)
offered			· · · ·	
Period	-1.546***	-2.095***	-1.495***	-2.087***
	(0,000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	31.55***	35.99***	30.42***	(0.000) 35.78 <sup>***</sup>
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	320	360	320	360
Number of subjects	32	36	32	36
Number of groups	8	9	8	9

Table A1. GLS Insiders' expectations of outsiders' transfers

p-values in parentheses \*p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

Note: In the first two columns of Table A1 the explanatory variable "Expectation higher than transfer" is a dummy variable equal to one if an insider's expectation is higher than the actual individual transfer offered by outsiders. In columns 3 and 4 "Expectation minus individual transfer offered" is a continuous variable measuring the deviation between expectations and transfers offered.

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# Working Papers in Economics and Statistics

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Esther Blanco, Tobias Haller, James M. Walker

Provision of public goods: Unconditional and conditional donations from outsiders

#### Abstract

The provision of public goods often benefits a larger group than those who activelyprovide the public good. In an experimental setting, this paper addresses institu-tional arrangements between subjects who can provide a public good (insiders) and subjects who benefit from the public good but cannot provide it (outsiders). We compare a setting of passive outsiders to situations where outsiders can either makeunconditional transfers (donations) or conditional transfers (contracts) to the insi-ders. The primary behavioral question is to what extent outsiders will respond to the opportunity to subsidize the contributions of insiders and will insiders use such subsidies to increase contributions or simply substitute them for their own contributions. The results suggest the latter. In fact, once conditional or unconditional transfers are allowed, insiders decrease contributions to the public good relative to the baseline condition without transfers.

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