


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**Skewness preferences and asset selection:  
An experimental study**

Tobias Bruenner, Rene Levinský and Jianying Qiu

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# Skewness preferences and asset selection:

## An experimental study

Tobias Br unner\*      Ren  Lev nsk <sup>††</sup>      Jianying Qiu<sup>‡</sup>

### Abstract

In this paper we experimentally test skewness preferences at the individual level. Several prospects that can be ordered with respect to the third-degree stochastic dominance (3SD) criterion are ranked by the participants of the experiment. We find that the skewness of a distribution has a significant impact on the decisions. Yet, while skewness has an impact, its direction differs substantially across subjects: 39% of our subjects act in accordance with skewness seeking and 10% seem to avoid skewness. On the level of individual decisions we find that the variance of the prospects and subjects' experience increase the probability of choosing the lottery with greater skewness.

JEL classification: D81, C91, G11

Keywords: Skewness, Stochastic dominance, Decision-making under uncertainty

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\*Institut zur Erforschung der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, Platz der Alten Synagoge, 79085 Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany.

‡Max Planck Institute of Economics, Kahlaische Strasse 10, 07745 Jena, Germany

§Economics Dept., University of Innsbruck, SOWI Building, Universitaetsstrasse 15, 6020 Innsbruck, Austria

†Corr. author. E-mail: levinsky@econ.mpg.de, Phone +49-3641-686642, Fax +49-3641-686667.

# 1 Introduction

Choice under uncertainty, especially in the portfolio choice literature, is still dominated by the mean-variance framework. This is surprising given that already Borch (1969) and Feldstein (1969) point to the inability of the mean-variance approach to consistently order risky assets with non-normal returns, and it is well known that asset return distributions cannot be fully characterized by the mean and variance; empirical studies typically find that many stock returns exhibit positive skewness and excess kurtosis (Chunhachinda et al. 1997; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Post and van Vliet 2006). When commenting on the potential role of higher order moments on individual decision-making, Tsiang (1972) notes that

...skewness preference must be a fairly prevalent pattern of investor's behavior, for modern financial institutions provide a number of devices for investors to increase the positive skewness of the returns of their investments: for example, the organization of limited liability joint stock companies, prearranged stop-loss sales on the stock and commodity markets, puts and calls in stocks, etc., which otherwise would perhaps not have been developed.

Consequently there is a considerable interest in exploring the effects of the third order central moment on investors' decision-making. Regressing the mean rate of return on investments with the sample estimates of moments of higher order, Arditti

(1967) finds the coefficient for the second moment to be positive and the impact of the third moment to be negative, whereas coefficients for higher orders are insignificant. Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) and Harvey and Siddique (2000) extend capital asset pricing models by (conditional) skewness and show that it significantly increases explanatory power.

A potential role for skewness preference is also highlighted by studies which look at investors' portfolio holdings. Several studies show that individual portfolios held by households are underdiversified in the sense that they contain too few assets or put too much weight on one or two stocks (see, e.g. Blume and Friend 1975; Kelly 1995). Simkowitz and Beedles (1978) and Conine and Tamarkin (1981) show that underdiversification compared to the mean-variance efficient portfolio can be the result of preference for skewness. Dorn and Sengmueller (2007) classify investors based on answers given on a questionnaire and find that investors that can be classified as gamblers hold portfolios with more positively skewed returns than average portfolios.<sup>1</sup> In Mitton and Vorkink's (2007) model with a heterogenous population of investors, portfolio holdings are underdiversified in equilibrium. They assume that one group of investors has traditional quadratic utility functions while the other group in addition to that exhibits a preference for skewness. They analyse a dataset of investor accounts and show that holders of underdiversified portfolios trade higher positive skewness for mean-variance efficiency. Since preference for skewness is not directly observable in their dataset Mitton and Vorkink (2007) present only indirect evidence that underdiversification is attributable to skewness preference.

These studies show that preference for skewness is widely believed to be an important characteristic of financial markets. Surprisingly, the issue whether investors really exhibit preference for skewness on an individual level is not well understood. In a broad sense, skewness preference means that investors are willing to sacrifice some of their expected gain or incur some additional risk for a small possibility of a high gain. In the expected utility framework this definition is operationalised by requiring the third derivative of the utility function to be positive.<sup>2</sup> Note that these two definitions can lead to different results. Brockett and Garven (1998) provide several examples where, faced with the choice between two prospects with equal means and variances but different levels of skewness, an investor with  $U''' > 0$  prefers the less skewed lottery. The reason for this is that the two prospects must also differ in higher moments than the third and this difference in higher moments can offset the different levels of skewness. For this reason it is impossible to unambiguously detect skewness preference using this narrow definition alone. In real-world markets this is further complicated by the fact that distributions are typically unknown and have to be replaced by ex-post estimated distributions which might not coincide with the distribution perceived by the investor at the time of making a decision.

The aim of our paper is to shed light on this issue by experimentally testing skewness seeking at the individual level. The experimental approach allows us to directly control the payoff distributions faced by the subjects. To ensure that choices between two lotteries are not driven by moments higher than the third, we construct the lotteries such that they can be ranked according to the third-degree stochastic

dominance criterion. To avoid the certainty effect and to minimise subjective probability distortion, we choose prospects with probabilities in the range  $[0.1, 0.9]$  and there is no certain investment possibility in our framework.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses decision-making under uncertainty and develops a theoretical approach capable of identifying skewness seeking in the observed choice set. Section 3 presents the experimental protocol, section 4 analyses the data and disentangle the principal determinants of the individual decisions. Finally, section 5 concludes with summarizing the main findings.

## 2 Methodology

Since it is impossible to obtain the utility function directly, one typically needs to rely on the preference revealed through choices, and this will be the main approach of this paper as well. But what kind of choice pattern can be unambiguously related to skewness preference? One possible way is to investigate the choice pattern on risky alternatives with the same mean and variance, but with different levels of skewness. This is based on the following observation.

Expanding the utility function,  $U(\cdot)$ , in a Taylor series around the mean  $\mu$  and taking expectation, one gets

$$E[U(X)] = U(\mu) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2!}U''(\mu) + \frac{m_3}{3!}U'''(\mu) + R_4, \quad (1)$$

where  $X$  is a random variable representing the investor's future wealth,  $\mu = E(X)$ ,

$\sigma^2 = \text{Var}(X)$ ,  $R_4 = \sum_4^\infty (m_i/i!)U^{(i)}(\mu)$ ,  $m_i = E[(X - \mu)^i]$  is the  $i^{\text{th}}$  central moment, and  $U^{(i)}$  is the  $i^{\text{th}}$  derivative of the utility function. Common assumptions on investors' preferences are that they prefer more to less ( $U'(x) > 0$ ) and are risk averse ( $U'' \leq 0$ ). Moreover, Tsiang (1972) shows that non-increasing (absolute or relative) risk aversion implies  $U'''(x) \geq 0$ . Thus, assuming convergence of the series and truncating the Taylor series after the third moment, one can order two distributions based on the first three moments (where  $U'''(x) > 0$  implies skewness preference). Tsiang (1972) provides a condition that justifies the truncation of the Taylor series. He shows that the truncation will be a good approximation if the risk, measured by the standard error assumed by the investor, remains a small fraction of her total wealth<sup>3</sup>. This will be true if the investor, when considering a risky asset, always integrates it into her total wealth portfolio.

Unfortunately, as suggested by numerous studies (see, e.g. Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Thaler and Johnson 1990; Kahneman and Tversky 1992; Thaler 1999), investors often evaluate a risky asset independently. This implies that the truncation of the Taylor series may lead to incorrect results, since the neglected part might be larger than the part kept, as shown in several examples in Brockett and Kahane (1992).

Scott and Horvath (1980) and Ingersoll (1987) show that for a strictly risk averse investor ( $U' > 0$  and  $U'' < 0$ ) with a strictly consistent direction of the third derivative ( $U'''(x)$  is positive, negative or zero for all  $x$ )  $U''' > 0$  must hold. However, the common interpretation of  $U''' > 0$  as preference for skewness is wrong. To see



this, note that  $U'''(\mu) > 0$  in (1) does not imply  $\partial E[U(X)]/\partial m_3 > 0$ . The partial derivative is not applicable here, since, as Brockett and Garven (1998) show, a change in the third moment leads to changes in other moments, too.

In this paper, we experimentally test whether individuals' utility functions possess the three regularity properties ( $U'(x) > 0$ ,  $U''(x) \leq 0$ , and  $U'''(x) \geq 0$ ) suggested by economic theory. To avoid potential problems mentioned above, we use the criterion of third-degree stochastic dominance proposed by Whitmore (1970). Stochastic dominance criteria provides a set of "rules" for making choices among risky alternatives consistent with the preferences of broad "classes" of utility functions without having to know their precise form. For example, the first-degree stochastic dominance provides the basis for (incomplete) ranking of risky assets for all individuals who simply prefer more to less. The second-degree stochastic dominance provides a rule for ranking risky assets for all individuals who both prefer more to less and are risk averse (Levy and Levy 2002). Similarly, the third-degree stochastic dominance provides an ordering rule for those whose preferences share the restrictions of second-degree stochastic dominance and, additionally, require that the degree of risk aversion decreases with wealth. By this criteria, individual's preference relation for any risky alternatives which can be ordered by the third-degree stochastic dominance criteria can be easily determined, *whatever* the explicit form of the utility function; the fact that the individual's utility function fulfils the three above mentioned general properties is sufficient. Proposing subjects a sequence of several risky alternatives, which can be ordered with respect to the third-degree stochastic

dominance criterion, we can link preferences, which are revealed by choice, directly to the shape of the utility function.

## 2.1 Third-Degree stochastic dominance

The third-degree stochastic dominance is proposed by Whitmore (1970). Let  $F(X)$  and  $G(X)$  be two less-than cumulative probability distributions, where  $X$  is a continuous or discrete random variable bounded in the range  $X \in [a, b]$  and representing the outcome of a prospect. Prospect  $F(X)$  is said to third-degree stochastically dominate (henceforth  $\succ_{3SD}$ ) prospect  $G(X)$  if and only if

$$\int_a^x \int_a^y [G(z) - F(z)] dz dy \geq 0 \quad \forall x \in [a, b] \quad (2)$$

$$\int_a^b [G(x) - F(x)] dx \geq 0 \quad (3)$$

and inequality (2) holds strict for at least one  $x \in [a, b]$ . Let  $\mathbb{U}_3$  denote the set of utility functions satisfying  $U'(x) > 0$ ,  $U''(x) \leq 0$ , and  $U'''(x) \geq 0$ . Whitmore (1970) shows that if  $F(X) \succ_{3SD} G(X)$ , the prospect  $F(X)$  yields higher expected utility than  $G(X)$  for *all* utility functions in  $\mathbb{U}_3$ .

In our study we focus on the role of the third moment in individual decision making, i.e. we would like to establish that

$$E_F[U(X)] > E_G[U(X)] \Rightarrow U'''(x) > 0. \quad (4)$$

Therefore, the influence of the third moment on decision making cannot be over-

weighted by the first two moments. To ensure this, let  $\Delta_n(x) = \int_a^x \Delta_{n-1}(y)dy$  for  $n > 1$ , where  $\Delta_1(x) = F(x) - G(x)$ . Noticing that  $\Delta_1(b) = 0$  and  $\Delta_n(a) = 0$ , we get

$$\begin{aligned} E_F[U(X)] - E_G[U(X)] &= \int_a^b U(x)d\Delta_1(x) \\ &= -U'(b)\Delta_2(b) + U''(b)\Delta_3(b) - \int_a^b U'''(x)\Delta_3(x)dx. \end{aligned}$$

From the definition of third-degree stochastic dominance,  $F(X) \succ_{3SD} G(X)$  implies that  $\Delta_2(b) \leq 0$  and  $\Delta_3(x) \leq 0 \forall x \in [a, b]$ . We can easily see that if  $U'(x) > 0$  and  $U''(x) \leq 0$   $U'''(x) < 0$  is only a sufficient condition for  $E_F[U(X)] - E_G[U(X)] > 0$ , but not a necessary condition. Since, if  $\Delta_2(b) < 0$ ,  $\Delta_3(b) < 0$ , and  $|U'(x)|$  or  $|U''(x)|$  is sufficiently larger than  $|U'''(x)|$ , we might still have  $E_F[U(X)] - E_G[U(X)] > 0$  even when  $U'''(x) < 0$ . To establish the explicit relation between the choice and the shape of the utility, we impose the following conditions to all pairs of risky alternatives ranked during the experiment:

$$\Delta_2(b) = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \Delta_3(b) = 0.$$

By Stone (1973)'s finding that

$$\int_a^b (b-x)^k dF(X) = k!F_k(b),$$

it can easily be shown

$$\Delta_2(b) = 0 \Leftrightarrow \mu_F = \mu_G \quad \text{and} \quad \Delta_3(b) = 0 \Leftrightarrow \sigma_F^2 = \sigma_G^2. \quad (5)$$

In other words, the conditions (5) guarantee the desired implication

$$F(X) \succ_{3SD} G(X) \text{ and } E_F[U(X)] > E_G[U(X)] \Rightarrow U'''(x) > 0 \quad (6)$$

$$F(X) \succ_{3SD} G(X) \text{ and } E_F[U(X)] \leq E_G[U(X)] \Rightarrow U'''(x) \leq 0. \quad (7)$$

### 3 The experimental design

In order to test for skewness seeking, 20 pairs of prospects (See Appendix) are generated, as, e.g.

prospect	gain	probability	mean	variance	skewness
1	10	0.1			
	110	0.9	100	900	-8/3
2	40	0.2			
	115	0.8	100	900	-3/2

In each pair one prospect third-degree stochastic dominates the other. The graphical demonstration for the pair in the example above is presented in Figure 1. The line represents  $\int_a^y (F_1(z) - F_2(z)) dz$ , the integral  $\int_a^x \int_a^y (F_1(z) - F_2(z)) dz dy$  is represented by the area between the the line and the horizontal axis. Since the positive part of the area is  $S_1 = \frac{1}{2}(70 - 10) \times 0.3 = 9$  and the negative part  $S_2 = \frac{1}{2}(115 - 70) \times 0.4 = 9$  the integral  $\int_a^x \int_a^y (F_1(z) - F_2(z)) dz dy$  is nonnegative for all  $x \in [10, 115]$ .

Except for two pairs, which will be discussed below, the two lotteries forming a pair have the same mean and variance. Each participant successively had to choose for each of the 20 pairs of lotteries the prospect that she prefers. To minimize possible framing effects, the order in which the prospects were presented was determined randomly and independently for each participant<sup>4</sup>.

In total, 99 subjects participated in the experiment. The subjects were students from the University of Jena, Germany. 48 of the participants were students of business administration or economics, 49 participants were enrolled in other subjects and for 2 participants the field of study is unknown. At the end of the experiment one pair of prospects was randomly chosen and played, and participants were paid according to the prospect they had chosen in the course of the experiment. A session lasted about 45 minutes and the payoffs ranged from 1 to 19 € with an average payoff of 9.91 €. The experiment was implemented using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).

## 4 Results

Figure 2 shows the distribution of individuals characterised by the number of responses in accordance with skewness seeking. The dotted line follows a binomial distribution, i.e. it represents the decisions of individuals who are indifferent between the two alternatives in each of the 20 pairs and therefore choose randomly. The binomial distribution has most of its mass at the average of 10 with only 4% of

the participants preferring the more skewed prospect in more than 14 or less than 6 of the 20 choices (see also Table 1).

On contrary, the actual distribution, represented by diamonds has considerably more mass on its tails. Only 51% of the participants choose the more skewed prospect between 6 and 14 times as compared to 96% predicted by the binomial distribution. This shows that the third moment does matter.

Around 39% of the participants prefer the prospect with greater skewness in at least 15 of the 20 rounds. Although at the same time 10% of the participants chose the more skewed prospect in less than 6 rounds, this is clear evidence that for many participants skewness is a positive factor in their decision-making process. The last two lines of Table 1 show that the results for the two subgroups, students of business administration/economics and other students, are very similar suggesting that basic knowledge of decision theory has no effect on the decisions. Although the thresholds 5 and 15 are chosen to represent the usual 5% significant level, they might seem arbitrary. Hence two other combinations are chosen for comparison: 4 and 16, and 6 and 14. These results are reported in Table 2. It can be seen that the results are robust. According to the binomial prediction there should be around 15 times more people who choose the more skewed lottery between 7 and 13 times than people who choose the more skewed lottery 14 times or more. Table 2 shows that there are even slightly more subjects who choose the more skewed prospects more than 13 times than between 7 and 13 times.

Figure 3 shows the proportion of subjects that chose the prospect with greater skewness for each of the 20 rounds. In the first two rounds around 40% of the subjects chose the more skewed prospect, from the third to the sixth round the proportion rises above 50% and for most of the remaining rounds the proportion of subjects preferring the more skewed prospect stays above two thirds. Since the sequence in which the pairs are presented to the subjects is chosen randomly for each subject, which pair of prospects is presented in which round varies across participants. (Moreover, only one randomly determined prospect is eventually played and paid out and therefore there are no hedging opportunities between rounds.)

The evolution of preferences follows the discovered preference hypothesis which Plott (1996) elaborated for the rationality in individual behavior. The agents' choices reflect a kind of myopia during the first phase of the experiment where the individuals are confronted with a new type of task. In the second phase, the individual awareness of the environment stabilizes the choices. For example in our data set considering only the 56 subjects who reveal skewness preferences already in the first half of the experiment (choosing the skewed prospect at least 6 times out of ten, with average 7.48) we observe that these subjects increase their number of skewness preferred choices in the second half of the experiment to 7.84. The intensification of skewness preferences is stronger for the 27 non-economic students in the sub-sample, who increase the number for choices by even 0.7 (from 7.59 to 8.29), the choices of then 29 students of economics are more stable (7.38 and 7.41). This fits well to Plott's anticipation: the economics students are more familiar with the type of the

presented task and their choices do not reveal the dynamic adjustment we observe for the non-economists.

We conclude that the number of repetitions increases either the preference for skewed prospects or the ability to detect these. We observe a weak version of ‘learning’ without feedback as, e.g., Weber (2003).

However our results will be less interesting if skewness only plays a marginal role compared to variance. To examine the relative importance of skewness and variance on subjects’ choices, we include the following pair:

prospect	gain	probability	mean	variance	skewness
1	55	0.4			
	130	0.6	100	1350	-0.41
2	85	0.8			
	160	0.2	100	900	1.50

Here  $2 \succ_{3SD} 1$ . Notice that prospect 2 not only has larger skewness but also smaller variance<sup>5</sup>. If variance plays a much more important role than skewness, we would expect the more skewed prospect, prospect 2, to be chosen more frequently than other 18 pairs with identical variance. 66% subjects chose prospect 2, which is not significantly different from the choice patterns of other pairs.

When constructing lotteries with two outcomes with the same mean and variance, the prospect with greater skewness also exhibits a higher naive expected value.<sup>6</sup>

To investigate whether our results merely reflect the fact that subjects base their



decisions on naive expectations, we included the following pair:

prospect	gain	probability	mean	naive mean	variance	skewness
1	40	0.5				
	160	0.5	100	100	3600	0
2	52	0.25				
	60	0.4	100	$97 \frac{1}{3}$	3456	.62
	180	0.35				

Here, prospect 2  $\succ_{3SD}$  prospect 1 but prospect 1 has a higher naive expected value. We admit that the difference of the naive means of the two prospects is not huge, unfortunately, since the prospects has to be third-degree stochastic comparable, it is not possible to construct a pair with a more pronounced difference of naive means. And, as shown above, this small difference is unlikely to significantly affect choices. 70% of the participants chose prospect 2, the prospect with greater skewness. This share does not differ from the choice patterns of other pairs and indicates that naive expectations are not the driving force behind our results.

In order to investigate the decisions taken by subjects more closely, we estimate a generalised probit model with mixed effects.<sup>7</sup> We first estimated the full model, i.e., the one including all possible interaction effects. These interaction terms, however, were dropped from the final model since they turned out to be susceptible to slight changes in specifications. In the following we report the results that are most robust. Explanatory variables are time ( $t$ ), difference of skewness between the more skewed and the less skewed one ( $\Delta S$ ), standard deviation of prospects ( $Std$ ), and the order

in which the prospects were presented on the screen ( $Up = 1$  : prospect with higher skewness appeared above the prospect with lower skewness and  $Up = 0$  : otherwise). Random effects that vary across the 99 subjects are the intercept and the coefficient of  $\Delta S$ . These random effects are included to take account of the observation that our subject pool is very heterogenous.  $y_{it}$  is 1 if subject  $i$  has chosen the prospect with greater skewness in period  $t$  and zero otherwise;  $y_{it}^*$  is an unobservable continuous variable underlying the discrete decision  $y_{it}$ . Formally, the model is as follows:

$$y_{it}^* = \alpha + u_i + (\beta_1 + v_i) \cdot \Delta S_{it} + \beta_2 \cdot StD_{it} + \beta_3 \cdot t + \beta_4 \cdot Up_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (8)$$

$$y_{it} = 1 \quad \text{if } y_{it}^* > 0 \quad \text{and } 0 \text{ otherwise ,}$$

where  $i \in \{1, \dots, 99\}$  denotes the 99 subjects,  $t \in \{1, \dots, 20\}$  denotes the 20 rounds,  $u_i \sim N(0, \sigma_u^2)$  denotes the random effects in the intercept for each participant,  $v_i \sim N(0, \sigma_v^2)$  denotes the random effects in the difference of skewness for each participant, and  $\varepsilon_{it} \sim N(0, \sigma_\varepsilon^2)$ . The results of the regression are presented in Table 3.

Interestingly, the difference in skewness between two prospects does not significantly affect the probability that subjects choose the prospect with greater skewness. Instead, the variance has a significant positive impact: participants are more likely to pick the prospect with higher skewness when the prospects have high variance. This is probably because the larger the standard deviation of prospects, the larger the range of the utility function relevant for decision making. Hence the change of the shape of the utility function (i.e. the difference of the rate of change of marginal

utility), which is the origin of skewness seeking, becomes easier to detect.

The results from the probit model also support our previous observation that the probability of choosing the more skewed prospect increases over time. However, after excluding the first four periods (and considering them as practice (or warm-up) rounds to get subjects acquainted with the setup of the experiment), the time parameter becomes insignificant. Finally, the order in which the two prospects of a pair were presented has no effect on the decision.

The standard deviation of the random effects of the constant  $\sigma_u$  and the difference in skewness  $\sigma_v$  are quite large which documents the heterogeneity of our subject pool with respect to skewness. This supports the theoretical analysis of Mitton and Vorkink (2007) who introduce heterogenous agents with different degrees of preference for skewness to obtain underdiversified portfolios in equilibrium.

## 5 Concluding remarks

Our results indicate that ignoring higher moments is not justified when studying decision-making under uncertainty. In line with many empirical studies in the finance literature (see, e.g. Arditti 1967; Kraus and Litzenberger 1976; Harvey and Siddique 2000), we find evidence for skewness seeking. However, our results suggest that the case for skewness seeking is not as clear cut as these empirical studies suggest. Our pool of 99 subjects is very heterogenous with respect to the behav-

ior towards skewness, ranging from 3 subjects who chose the prospect with greater skewness in all 20 periods – the probability of meeting such an individual if choices were purely random is lower than one against one million ( $= 2^{-20}$ ) – to 2 subjects who avoided skewed prospects in all but 2 periods. In this respect our study provides experimental evidence on the behavioral basis of Mitton and Vorkink (2007) and thereby helps to explain equilibrium underdiversification.

Our findings are important for the construction of mean-variance-skewness efficient portfolios. So far it has been assumed that there is a positive tradeoff between the expected return and skewness (see e.g. Chuhachinda et al. 1997). Our results show that this is not true for all investors. Moreover, even for skewness seeking investors this tradeoff may crucially depend on the variance of the portfolio considered.

Our last remark is related to the design of individual decision-making experiments. There are two essential research questions in individual decision-making: what is the initial choice (Costa-Gomes et al. 2001) and which kind of (stable) preferences evolves after a certain number of periods (Plott 1996).

In our experiment we employ a design similar to Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) (no feedback after any round should suppress learning as much as possible). In spite of that we observe a clear behavioral shift over time. In the first round only 40% of the subjects choose the more skewed prospect, then this probability increases for about 5% per round until the fifth round, where it reaches about 65% and remains more or less stable until the end of the experiment. Finally, we observe the convergence

of preferences predicted by Plott's discovered preference hypothesis.

We conclude that we observe "learning" without feedback in our experiment. This questions the possibility to explore the initial individual choices in experiments where the tasks are subsequently repeated even if the subjects are not provided with information between the rounds.

# Notes

<sup>1</sup>The notion that gamblers prefer skewness has already been put forward by Golec and Tamarkin (1998).

<sup>2</sup>Departing from expected utility theory, Barberis and Huang (ming) demonstrate that cumulative prospect theory investors trade lower average returns for higher skewness.

<sup>3</sup>See also Kraus and Litzenberger (1976), Scott and Horvath (1980) and Conine and Tamarkin (1981) for more detailed discussions about the reasons for ignoring higher moments.

<sup>4</sup>Random lottery pair design as in Holt and Laury (2002).

<sup>5</sup>Within a pair of prospects, it is impossible that one prospect third-degree stochastically dominates another at the same time has a larger variance.

<sup>6</sup>The naive expected value is the average evaluated using equal probabilities for all outcomes, e.g., the naive means of the lotteries presented in the example at the beginning of section 3 are 60 and 77.5, respectively.

<sup>7</sup>See Pinheiro and Bates (2000) for a good reference of mixed effects models.

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# Appendix

One decision screen of the experiment:



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Prospect	Gain	Probability
1	10	0.1
	110	0.9

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Prospect	Gain	Probability
2	40	0.2
	115	0.8

---

Please choose the one you prefer

In the experiment, the two colors used are blue and orange.

The 20 pairs of prospects used in the experiment.

Pair	Prospect	Gain	Prob.	Mean	Std. Deviation	Skewness
1	1	60	0,36	100	30,00	-0,58
		122,5	0,64			
	2	70	0,5	100	30,00	0,00
		130	0,5			
2	1	40	0,2	100	30,00	-1,50
		115	0,8			
	2	60	0,36	100	30,00	-0,58
		122,5	0,64			
3	1	77,5	0,64	100	30,00	0,58
		140	0,36			
	2	85	0,8	100	30,00	1,50
		160	0,2			
4	1	40	0,2	100	30,00	-1,50
		115	0,8			
	2	77,5	0,64	100	30,00	0,58
		140	0,36			
5	1	85	0,8	100	30,00	1,50
		160	0,2			
	2	90	0,9	100	30,00	2,67
		190	0,1			
6	1	93	0,3	100	4,58	-0,87
		103	0,7			
	2	97	0,7	100	4,58	0,87
		107	0,3			
7	1	70	0,4	100	24,49	-0,41
		120	0,6			
	2	80	0,6	100	24,49	0,41
		130	0,4			
8	1	40	0,5	100	60,00	0,00
		160	0,5			
	2	52	0,25	100	58,79	0,62
		180	0,35			
9	1	55	0,4	100	36,74	-0,41
		130	0,6			
	2	85	0,8	100	30,00	1,50
		160	0,2			
10	1	10	0,25	100	51,96	-1,15
		130	0,75			
	2	70	0,75	100	51,96	1,15
		190	0,25			

Pair	Prospect	Gain	Prob.	Mean	Std. Deviation	Skewness
11	1	10	0,1	100	30,00	-2,67
		110	0,9			
	2	40	0,2			
		115	0,8			
12	1	10	0,1	100	30,00	-2,67
		110	0,9			
	2	70	0,5			
		130	0,5			
13	1	10	0,1	100	30,00	-2,67
		110	0,9			
	2	85	0,8			
		160	0,2			
14	1	10	0,1	100	30,00	-2,67
		110	0,9			
	2	90	0,9			
		190	0,1			
15	1	40	0,2	100	30,00	-1,50
		115	0,8			
	2	70	0,5			
		130	0,5			
16	1	40	0,2	100	30,00	-1,50
		115	0,8			
	2	85	0,8			
		160	0,2			
17	1	40	0,2	100	30,00	-1,50
		115	0,8			
	2	90	0,9			
		190	0,1			
18	1	70	0,5	100	30,00	0,00
		130	0,5			
	2	90	0,9			
		190	0,1			
19	1	70	0,5	100	30,00	0,00
		130	0,5			
	2	85	0,8			
		160	0,2			
20	1	20	0,5	100	80,00	0,00
		180	0,5			
	2	60	0,8			
		260	0,2			

# Figures

Figure 1: Difference of cumulative distributions  $F_1$  and  $F_2$ , integrated




Figure 2: Cumulative density function of the number of times subjects have chosen the prospect with greater skewness.  $\bullet$  is the binomial distribution and  $\diamond$  is the actual distribution of the experimental subjects.





Figure 3: Proportion of subjects choosing the prospect with greater skewness per period.





# Tables

Table 1: Distribution of the participants.

	$k \leq 5$	$5 < k < 15$	$k \geq 15$
Binomial prediction	0.02	0.96	0.02
All subjects	0.10	0.51	0.39
Econ./B.A. students	0.09	0.55	0.36
Other students	0.12	0.46	0.42

*Each participant is characterised by the number of rounds she has chosen the more skewed prospect ( $k$ ).*

Table 2: Distribution of the participants.

	$k \leq 4$	$4 < k < 16$	$k \geq 16$
Binomial prediction	0.006	0.988	0.006
All subjects	0.081	0.636	0.283
Econ./B.A. students	0.042	0.681	0.277
Other students	0.115	0.603	0.282
	$k \leq 6$	$6 < k < 14$	$k \geq 14$
Binomial prediction	0.058	0.885	0.058
All subjects	0.141	0.425	0.434
Econ./B.A. students	0.128	0.436	0.436
Other students	0.154	0.404	0.442

*Each participant is characterised by the number of rounds she has chosen the more skewed prospect ( $k$ ).*

Table 3: Results of probit regression

Expl. Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-statistic	p-value
$\alpha$	-0.5006*	0.1213	-4.1274	0.0000
$\Delta S$	-0.0309	0.0368	-0.8409	0.4005
StD	0.0151*	0.0021	7.1101	0.0000
t	0.0334*	0.0051	6.5058	0.0000
Up	0.0571	0.0603	0.9468	0.3438
Std. dev. of the random effects	$\sigma_u = 0.4611; \sigma_v = 0.2663$			
Std. dev. of the error term	$\sigma_e = 0.9278$			
Number of observations	1980			

\* Significant at  $p = 0.01$ .

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Tobias Bruenner, Rene Levinský and Jianying Qiu

Skewness preferences and asset selection: An experimental study

**Abstract**

In this paper we experimentally test skewness preferences at the individual level. Several prospects that can be ordered with respect to the third-degree stochastic dominance (3SD) criterion are ranked by the participants of the experiment. We find that the skewness of a distribution has a significant impact on the decisions. Yet, while skewness has an impact, its direction differs substantially across subjects: 39% of our subjects act in accordance with skewness seeking and 10% seem to avoid skewness. On the level of individual decisions we find that the variance of the prospects and subjects' experience increases the probability of choosing the lottery with greater skewness.

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